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Articles
DISCOVERING A BETTER WAY: THE NEED
FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIL LITIGATION REFORM
JOHN H. BEISNER†
[T]he American civil justice system is indeed different, and the idea
of discovery is a fairly novel one. [Discovery] came . . . with the 1938
experiment in revising the rules of [civil] procedure. It was an
experiment when the civil rules were adopted[,] . . . which still hasn’t
been revisited.
1
– Judge Paul Niemeyer

ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the myriad problems posed by unfettered
discovery in the United States. Rather than promoting fairness and
efficiency in the American legal system, plaintiffs today often use
discovery in an abusive and vexatious manner to coerce defendants
into accepting quick settlements. Over the past several decades,
discovery has expanded in both scope and magnitude such that
discovery costs now account for at least half of the total litigation costs
in any given case. The advent of electronic discovery has only
exacerbated the problem, given the sheer number of electronic
documents generated in the course of business and the corresponding
time, effort, and cost associated with electronic discovery. Although
recent efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
failed to combat the abuses of civil discovery, meaningful and
effective reform of the current system is possible. This Article
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proposes a number of pragmatic reforms—including adopting the
English rule for discovery disputes and suspending discovery during
the pendency of a motion to dismiss—to mitigate the abusive and
costly nature of discovery in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1938, pretrial discovery has been one of the
most divisive and nettlesome issues in civil litigation in the United
States. Discovery was designed to prevent trials by ambush and to
2
ensure just adjudications. But it has fallen well short of these
laudable goals. Instead, the pretrial discovery process is broadly
viewed as dysfunctional, with litigants utilizing discovery excessively
3
and abusively. Plaintiffs’ attorneys routinely burden defendants with
costly discovery requests and engage in open-ended “fishing
expeditions” in the hope of coercing a quick settlement. As a result,
discovery frequently becomes the focus of litigation, rather than a
4
mere step in the adjudication process. By some estimates, discovery
costs now comprise between 50 and 90 percent of the total litigation
5
costs in a case. Discovery abuse also represents one of the principal
6
causes of delay and congestion in the judicial system. These problems
2. Drafters of the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure believed that the discovery
process would not only encourage parties to settle but also help litigants reach a just outcome by
making all relevant evidence available to both sides. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique of Proposals for Change, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301–
03 (1978) (noting that the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intended the rules to
increase disclosure of information, thereby reducing the adversarial nature of trial preparation);
William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 701, 703 (1989) (asserting that the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
aimed to encourage settlements and the just resolution of disputes by creating a “procedural
framework . . . free of surprise and technical encumbrance”).
3. Griffin D. Bell, Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (“Scholars, litigators, judges, and,
more recently, even politicians have joined in unusual consensus to urge that reform of the
discovery process is needed.”).
4. Id. at 11 (“[Discovery] has become the focal point of litigation instead of a means to an
end.”).
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that “discovery cost
accounts for roughly 80 percent of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases”); Thomas E.
Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery
and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547–48
& tbl.4 (1997) (“Among attorneys reporting discovery expenses, the proportion of litigation
expenses attributable to discovery is typically fairly close to 50 [percent] . . . . Half estimated
that discovery accounted for 25 [percent] to 70 [percent] of litigation expenses.”); Judicial
Conference Adopts Rules Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, THIRD BRANCH, Oct.
1999, at 2–3 (“Discovery represents 50 percent of the litigation costs in the average case and up
to 90 percent of the litigation costs in cases in which it is actively used.”).
6. Louis Harris & Assocs., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 733 (1989) (polling two hundred federal and eight hundred state judges, and finding
that many judges believed that discovery abuse “is the most important cause of delays in
litigation and of excessive costs”).
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have led to perennial calls for discovery reform and have resulted in
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules)
8
in 1980, 1983, 1993, 2000, and 2006. Anxiety over abusive discovery
practices has also led many federal and state courts to experiment
with local reforms, but such efforts have been largely unsuccessful.
The exponential growth in the volume of electronic documents
created by modern computer systems has exacerbated the problem of
abusive discovery and is jeopardizing the legal system’s ability to
9
handle even routine matters. One recent case, for example, involved
production of a volume of electronic documents equivalent to a stack
10
of paper “137 miles high.” But the problem is not simply one of
scope. Discovery of computer-based information costs more,
consumes more time, and “creates more headaches” than
11
conventional, paper-based discovery. Indeed, the effort and expense
associated with electronic discovery are so excessive that, regardless
of a case’s merits, settlement is often the most fiscally prudent course.
The foregoing assertions cannot be dismissed as hyperbole. A
recent joint survey of trial lawyers conducted by the American
College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the Advancement of
the American Legal System unambiguously concluded that “our
7. The growing call for discovery reform was addressed at the 1976 Pound Conference,
convened at the request of Chief Justice Burger to assess growing problems in litigation. The
Conference’s final report observed that “[w]ild fishing expeditions . . . seem to be the norm,”
and lamented the “[u]nnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the
litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a lever toward settlement”
that had come to characterize the American legal system. William H. Erickson, The Pound
Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76
F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978). Two years later, in 1978, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure discussed refining the scope of discovery in civil litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment (noting that abuses of discovery led, in part,
to the 1980 Amendments to Rule 26, which required parties to participate in discovery
conferences).
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (listing amendment dates).
9. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?,
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 1 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article10.pdf (recognizing
that the increasing volume and scope of information have stressed the litigation system and are
making searching through discovery prohibitively expensive).
10. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 280, 283 (D. Del. 2008).
11. Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Feb.
2001, at 3, 3; see also Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery
Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67–68 (2007) (“[E]-discovery is more time-consuming, more
burdensome, and more costly than conventional discovery.”); Martin H. Redish, Electronic
Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 592 (2001) (“[E]lectronic discovery can
be predicted, as a general matter, to give rise to burdens and expense that are of a completely
different magnitude from those encountered in traditional discovery.”).
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12

discovery system is broken” and that “[e]lectronic discovery, in
13
particular, needs a serious overhaul.” Seventy-one percent of the
survey’s respondents—consisting of a group of trial attorneys from
both the plaintiffs’ and defense bars—believe that discovery is used as
14
“a tool to force settlement.” These views are admittedly subjective,
but they are confirmed by other empirical evidence showing that the
number of discovery disputes resolved by courts has risen
precipitously in the past decade—an increase that coincides with the
15
ascendancy of electronic discovery.
The origins of the problems in the American civil discovery
system are varied and complex. One principal cause is the American
16
rule, which obligates parties to bear their own litigation costs. This
fosters the indiscriminate use of discovery and encourages parties to
burden their opponents with costly and time-consuming information
requests. The tandem increase in cost and delay associated with
discovery can also be traced to the failure of procedural rules to
adequately limit the scope and amount of discovery permitted, a
problem that has been exacerbated considerably by electronic
discovery. The adversarial system itself also promotes discovery
abuse. This system incentivizes abusive discovery tactics that can
provide a competitive advantage. Such tactics include coercing a
settlement by increasing an opponent’s costs through unnecessary
information requests and compelling an opponent to produce
12. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (2009), available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTLIAALS Final Report Revised 4-15-09.pdf.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 9.
15. During the nearly three-decade period before electronic discovery became
commonplace in 1998, a total of 3,128 cases involved “discovery disputes.” By contrast, 7,207
such cases have arisen since 1999, based on a search of Westlaw’s ALLFEDS database
performed on April 14, 2010. The search updates a search first performed by Professor John S.
Beckerman. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 508 (2000). Professor Beckerman notes that his figures could potentially be overstated
because he made no effort to exclude criminal cases or cases in which the phrase “discovery
dispute” is mentioned only in passing (for example, “this case was free of any discovery
disputes”). Id. at 508 n.12. I have not attempted to correct for this potential flaw. Professor
Beckerman justifies his approach by opining that “judges would rarely include the words
‘discovery dispute’ in a reported opinion unless pretrial litigation actually contained a discovery
dispute that the judge thought noteworthy.” Id.
16. The English rule, in contrast, requires the losing party to bear the legal costs of the
prevailing party. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (8th ed. 2004).
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confidential, proprietary, or embarrassing information. Fears of
malpractice claims also lead attorneys to adopt a leave-no-stoneunturned approach to discovery. Finally, for a variety of reasons,
courts have been reluctant to assertively manage the discovery
process or to impose meaningful sanctions for abuses.
All of these problems have been exacerbated by the particular
challenges of electronic discovery. A recent case vividly illustrates
how electronic documents, particularly email, are vastly altering the
17
discovery landscape. In Matter of Fannie Mae Securities Litigation,
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) was
18
served with a third-party subpoena to produce certain emails.
OFHEO’s in-house counsel agreed to voluntarily comply with the
subpoena. Unfortunately, this agreement was made before OFHEO
comprehended the time and expense that full compliance would
entail. After OFHEO missed numerous discovery deadlines, the
19
district court held the federal agency in contempt. The court ordered
OFHEO to produce all documents responsive to the subpoena, even
those otherwise protected by privilege. Because many of the emails
were no longer reasonably accessible and because the plaintiffs
sought production of 80 percent of all of OFHEO’s emails, the
federal agency ultimately spent $6 million to comply with the
20
subpoena—approximately one-ninth of its entire annual budget. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld the contempt citation, rejecting OFHEO’s argument that it
should not have been compelled to comply with the subpoena in light
21
of the excessive costs involved.
The Fannie Mae case provides an unsettling glimpse of the future
of civil litigation in the United States. The burgeoning size and
22
complexity of cases, coupled with the explosive growth of electronic
records, is stretching the pretrial discovery process beyond its
breaking point. Because discovery occupies such an important role in
the American legal system, resolving this problem is critical. Without

17. In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
18. Id. at 816.
19. Id. at 818.
20. Id. at 817.
21. Id. at 821–22.
22. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 3, at 8 (noting that “the United States has become a
litigious society in which the courts are being asked to resolve an almost incomprehensible
spectrum of problems”).
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reform, the delay, waste, and expense signified by the Fannie Mae
case will become routine.
Importantly, effective reform is possible. Some state courts have
shown how. For example, Oregon’s rules of civil procedure require
plaintiffs to plead a “plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts
23
constituting a claim for relief.” This fact-based standard is more
stringent than the notice-pleading standard in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Similarly, Oregon’s discovery rules are more limited
than those in the Federal Rules. No more than thirty requests for
24
admission are permitted, and interrogatories are not permitted at all.
Notably, a survey conducted in Multnomah County, Oregon, found
that parties in Oregon state court rarely file discovery-related
25
motions. These data suggest that Oregon’s stricter pleading and
discovery standards actually result in higher-quality claims being
pursued in state court, with less disputed-motion practice impeding
the orderly administration of cases.
Similar rule changes would be the most effective way to curb
discovery abuse at the federal level. In the interim, however, some
discovery problems can be alleviated under the existing rules if they
are applied more rigorously. Most notably, judges should institute
more formalized case-management orders that set clear guidelines for
discovery early in a case and pay closer attention to discovery
disputes when they first begin to percolate.
This Article examines the escalating problems in the U.S. civil
discovery system and how they can be remedied. Part I reviews the
origins and development of civil discovery in the United States, which
sowed the seeds for today’s problems. Part II demonstrates how
electronic discovery has led to increased abuses of the discovery
system. Part III discusses prior efforts to reform civil discovery in the
United States and analyzes why they have been largely ineffective.
Finally, Part IV proffers potential remedies to the problems, taking
particular note of the approaches various states have adopted, as well
as reforms suggested by practitioners.

23. OR. R. CIV. P. 18A.
24. OR. R. CIV. P. 45F.
25. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN
THE OREGON COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY 15–16 (2010) (proposing that
the stricter limits on discovery in Oregon explain why, out of 495 cases, “only 54 motions
concerning any aspect of discovery were observed”).
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part traces the history of the federal civil-discovery system
and shows how the gradual weakening of discovery limits increased
opportunities for abuse and how early reform efforts failed to
counteract them.
A. The Origins of Civil Discovery in the United States
Liberal pretrial discovery is a fundamental component of the
civil justice system in the United States. But it was not always so.
American courts initially followed the approach of English courts of
26
law, in which pretrial discovery was almost nonexistent. In fact,
27
under the Field Code, which represented the first code of civil
procedure in the United States and served as the framework for the
rules of civil procedure in most American courts throughout the late
28
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, discovery could not begin
unless a plaintiff could independently state facts to substantiate the
29
claims set forth in the complaint. Even if a plaintiff could reach the
discovery phase, few methods of inquiry were available.

26. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the
1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694 (1998) (“Historically, discovery had been
extremely limited in both England and the United States.”). Professor Subrin explains that the
notion of discovery was incongruous with early common law, which viewed litigation “not as a
rational quest for truth, but rather a method by which society could determine which side God
took to be truthful or just.” Id. at 694–95.
27. The Field Code was drafted by David Dudley Field for New York and subsequently
adopted by other states. Distrustful of authority—particularly the unelected judiciary—and
intent on protecting the privacy of individuals against unnecessary intrusion, the Field Code
provided for extremely limited discovery. Id. at 696.
28. By 1928, twenty-eight of the forty-eight states had adopted the Field Code. See
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19–20 (1928). Federal
courts generally followed the Field Code as well. Under the Conformity Act of 1872, federal
courts were obligated to hew “as near as may be” to the civil procedure rules of the state in
which they were located. Act of June 1, 1872 (Conformity Act), ch. 255, §§ 5–6, 17 Stat. 196, 197
(repealed 1948); see also Subrin, supra note 26, at 692 (stating that the Conformity Act of 1872
was the initial target of criticism for proponents of a uniform set of procedural rules for civil
cases in law).
29. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241 (1989) (“Under the [Field] codes, a
plaintiff could not even get into discovery unless she could independently substantiate such
suspicions, for substantiation had to be manifested in a complaint that stated ‘facts.’”); see also
Subrin, supra note 26, at 694–97 (asserting that under the Field Code, pleadings were used to,
among other purposes, “eliminate . . . factual issues and to focus on the controversy”).
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30

Interrogatories, for example, were strictly prohibited. Depositions,
document requests, and other discovery practices commonplace in
modern litigation were rare and could be undertaken only with leave
31
of court. Depositions, moreover, were not as they are today—only
32
the opposing party could be deposed, and only in open court. Such
33
antagonism to discovery was captured in Carpenter v. Winn. In that
case, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to “pry into the case of
[an] adversary to learn its strength or weakness” as an impermissible
34
“fishing bill.”
This general distrust of discovery, however, did not last. States
eventually began to liberalize the discovery process. By 1932, some
35
were permitting interrogatories, depositions of witnesses, or both.
Still, despite these changes, pretrial discovery in state courts remained
36
37
extremely rare. This held true in federal courts as well.

30. Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 332 (1988) (“The Field Code eliminated
equitable bills of discovery, and interrogatories as part of the equitable bill.”).
31. Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level
Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 601 (2002) (stating that under the Field codes, plaintiffs
had “little opportunity to examine documents that might be relevant and useful, use
depositions, interrogatories, or other tools of information gathering to facilitate the proof of an
existing or new theory of the case”).
32. Subrin, supra note 30, at 333 (asserting that the depositions permitted by the Code
were “in lieu of calling the adverse party at the trial, and subject to the same rules of
examination as at trial” and that a “pretrial deposition . . . was to be before a judge, who would
rule on evidence objections” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The few federal statutes
permitting depositions, however, were designed only to preserve the testimony of witnesses who
could not appear at trial, rather than to uncover new information. At the time, a federal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934), permitted depositions de bene esse, but only when the witness resided
more than one hundred miles from the court, was at sea or about to leave the United States, or
was old or infirm. Subrin, supra note 26, at 698. A second federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1934),
permitted depositions dedimus potestatem, which could be taken only upon a showing that it was
(i) necessary to avoid the failure or delay of justice, (ii) the witness was beyond the reach of the
court’s process, (iii) the deposition could not be taken de bene esse, and (iv) the deposition was
requested in good faith and not for discovery purposes. Subrin, supra note 26, at 698–99 (citing 6
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 app. 100 (3d ed. 1997)).
33. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533 (1911).
34. Id. at 540. The Massachusetts Supreme Court articulated a similar disdain for
discovery: “This is what Lord Hardwicke termed a ‘fishing bill,’ to enable the plaintiff to learn
whether he may sue his judgment against Kingsbury, and levy on the land, with prospect of
success . . . . As a bill of discovery only, we think it cannot be maintained.” Fiske v. Slack, 38
Mass. (21 Pick.) 361, 364, 366 (1838) (citations omitted).
35. Subrin, supra note 26, at 702–04 (discussing the evolution of the federal discovery rules
to permit more frequent use of interrogation through the taking of depositions).
36. Id.
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B. Adoption of the Federal Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938. The
drafters recognized that the absence of pretrial discovery sometimes
placed litigants at a serious disadvantage, leading to trials by
38
ambush. Concerned that the outcomes of trials often hinged not on
the merits of the case but on the skills of counsel or the financial
resources of the parties, the drafters were determined to implement a
system that would allow the parties to have the “fullest possible
39
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.” The drafters believed
that wide-ranging discovery would help ensure a just determination in
all matters and remedy the imbalance of power between the wealthy
40
and the poor.
This shift to liberal discovery was also premised on two practical
considerations. First, the drafters believed that pretrial discovery
would greatly reduce litigation costs. Without pretrial discovery,
parties could not easily discern what positions the opposition would
41
assert at trial. Prudent litigants therefore adopted an expensive and
42
wasteful be-prepared-for-anything approach to trial preparation.
The drafters believed that discovery would reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of each party’s case at an early stage, thereby facilitating

37. Id. Depositions were the sole discovery permitted in cases at law—aside from a bill of
particulars. Depositions were also available in equity, but only upon a showing of “good and
exceptional cause” for departing from the general rule that pretrial discovery was not permitted.
Id. at 699 (citing FED. R. EQ. 47 (repealed 1938), in GEORGE FREDERICK RUSH, EQUITY
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 221 (1913)).
38. William W Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be
More Effective than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1991) (“Discovery was intended to
provide each side with all relevant information about the case to help bring about settlement or,
if not, avoid trial by ambush.”).
39. Bell et al., supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).
40. See Schwarzer, supra note 38, at 178 (“[The drafters’] purpose was to bring about the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”); see also Kathleen L. Blaner,
Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Donald H. Green, Federal Discovery: Crown Jewel or Curse?,
LITIGATION, Summer 1998, at 8, 8 (“Discovery was considered a crown jewel because it sought
to open the courts to all elements of society. The drafters saw an imbalance of power between
the wealthy and the poor. By mandating a full exchange of information, the drafters thought
that they could help less powerful litigants prove their legal claims and thus redress the
imbalance.”).
41. See Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15
TENN. L. REV. 737, 737–38 (1939) (explaining that another problem with the prediscovery era
was that even when the pleadings accurately revealed the parties’ exact positions, they did not
reveal the nature or source of the proof that would be offered in support).
42. Id.
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43

early settlements and preserving valuable resources. Second, the
drafters concluded that pretrial discovery would be an efficient and
44
self-regulating process. Mutual self-interest, coupled with a desire to
avoid wasting clients’ time and money, would minimize discovery
disputes and lead to the expeditious exchange of relevant
45
information.
Importantly, however, the drafters of the original Federal Rules
dismissed warning signs indicating that these two key premises were
46
deeply flawed. After all, abuse was already prevalent even under the
limited discovery that some states permitted at that time. For
example, a few states permitted depositions but required that the
deposition be suspended if the parties could not resolve an objection
themselves. This led to various forms of mischief. In some small
towns, local lawyers would “take advantage of lawyers from the
city . . . . Knowing that their opponents [were] . . . not apt to wait over
until a rather tardy judge compel[led] an answer, they instruct[ed]
their clients to refuse to answer questions which clearly [were]
47
proper.”
Other abusive tactics familiar to modern practitioners were also
common by 1938. In states where parties were entitled to take
depositions, for instance, parties filed a motion to reschedule or
modify the scope of the depositions “in nearly every important
48
case.” In New York, where defendants were permitted discovery
only as it related to their affirmative defenses, defendants regularly
included in their answers “fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of
49
securing an examination of [the] adversary.” Similarly, in states that
permitted requests for admissions, parties would use such requests
“as a tactical weapon” by routinely demanding that their opponents
50
“admit practically every item of evidence.”
43. Bell et al., supra note 3, at 6–7; Schwarzer, supra note 38, at 178.
44. Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
Enough Is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579, 581.
45. Id.
46. See John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing
Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 657 (2008) (“[E]ven before the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . were enacted, many feared that excessive discovery would allow plaintiffs to
blackmail corporate defendants.”).
47. Subrin, supra note 26, at 703–04 (quoting GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY
BEFORE TRIAL 100–01 (1932)).
48. Id. at 704 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 67).
49. Id. at 705 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 132).
50. Id. at 706 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 201).

BEISNER IN FINAL.DOC

558

11/29/2010 6:52:13 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:547

But of all available methods of discovery, interrogatories
provided the most fertile ground for abuse. Overwhelming an
opponent with countless generic interrogatories or requests became a
common tactic. As one commentator notes, this tactic even predated
51
the arrival of modern photocopiers. Respondents to interrogatories
also engaged in abusive tactics. As interrogatories became more
52
common, respondents began providing vague or ambiguous answers.
This distorted the adversarial process, forcing parties to spend time
litigating the propriety of interrogatories rather than preparing their
claims and defenses. In Massachusetts, the excessive use of
interrogatories, combined with the prevalence of evasive answers,
imposed a “surprisingly heavy” burden on courts, compelling them to
devote “[a]lmost all of [their] motion hours . . . [to] deciding
53
objections to interrogatories.”
Despite the extent of these abuses in state courts, the drafters of
the 1938 Federal Rules radically expanded both the scope of
54
permissible discovery and the tools parties could use to obtain it. In
so doing, the drafters went “further than any single jurisdiction’s
55
discovery provisions.”
C. Early Application of the Federal Rules
Federal courts initially resisted the broad discovery provisions
provided in the new rules. Some courts, for example, limited
56
discovery to admissible evidence. Others allowed the requesting

51. Id. at 707 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 93).
52. Id. at 708 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 95).
53. Id. at 707–08 (quoting RAGLAND, supra note 47, at 94).
54. The new discovery tools included depositions upon oral examination, depositions upon
written examination, interrogatories to parties, requests for production of documents and things
and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes, physical and mental examinations of
persons, and requests for admission. FED. R. CIV. P. 30–36.
55. Subrin, supra note 26, at 719. The Federal Rules essentially made available all
discovery tools then in existence, which no state had done at that time. See id. (“[A]t the time
Sunderland drafted what became the federal discovery rules, no one state allowed the total
panoply of devices.”). Yet the Federal Rules also included significant limits. For example,
documents could be examined only upon a court order, and a showing of good cause was
necessary for the production of documents under the original Rule 34. Moskowitz, supra note
31, at 603.
56. Jonathan M. Redgrave & Ted. S. Hiser, The Information Age, Part I: Fishing in the
Ocean, A Critical Examination of Discovery in the Electronic Age, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 195, 199
(2001). Parties were therefore barred from seeking hearsay evidence during depositions. E.g.,
Maryland ex rel. Montvila v. Pan-Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213, 214–15 (D. Md. 1940);
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party to use discovery only to build its own case and not to test the
57
adversary’s claims or defenses. Courts even disagreed over whether
the discovery devices set out in the Federal Rules could be used
58
cumulatively.
In response to these and other disputes, the Federal Rules were
amended in 1946. The 1946 changes were intended to permit
unfettered discovery. For example, the amendments made clear that
discovery extended even to inadmissible evidence, provided the
59
evidence sought was likely to lead to admissible evidence. The
Supreme Court also lent its imprimatur to unfettered discovery. In
60
the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor, the Court declared that the
new discovery rules were “to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment” and that “[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing
expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
61
underlying his opponent’s case.” Although Hickman cautioned that
discovery could not be employed to annoy, embarrass, or oppress an
62
adversary, it declared that litigants were free to trawl for evidence
with few meaningful limitations.
Hickman’s effect was profound. Lower courts began to endorse
broad discovery, subject only to a nominal and increasingly soft
63
relevancy requirement. And this problem was not limited to federal

Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F.R.D. 215, 217 (W.D. Mo. 1940); Rose Silk Mills, Inc. v. Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 29 F. Supp. 504, 505–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
57. See, e.g., Poppino, 1 F.R.D. at 218 (“[M]ay [a plaintiff] obtain from his adversary not
only that evidence which will aid him to make out his case, but also that evidence which his
adversary might use to make out his defense? We shall be surprised if it shall ever be ruled that
the Supreme Court had any such revolutionary purpose. Nothing of that kind could be
accomplished by the old bill of discovery. The function of the bill of discovery was limited to
discovering what would aid the party seeking discovery in making out his case or his defense.”).
58. See Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (denying a motion to vacate
a deposition made on the grounds that the plaintiff had already “availed himself of every pretrial proceeding under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
59. Redgrave & Hiser, supra note 56, at 199.
60. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
61. Id. at 507.
62. Id. at 507–08.
63. See, e.g., Reed v. Swift & Co., 11 F.R.D. 273, 274 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (“It is much more
desirable to allow discovery of facts which may prove to be irrelevant and immaterial than to
deny discovery which may bring to light facts which are more material to the issues than any
facts theretofore known.”); Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo.
1950) (“It is no valid objection to interrogatories propounded under Rule 33 . . . to merely state
that they are irrelevant to the issues. . . . [T]he relevancy of interrogatories is to be determined
by their relevancy to the proceedings and subject-matter and not relevancy to the issues in an
action.”).
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courts. State courts generally fell in line with the liberal federal
64
approach to discovery.
D. 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules
By many accounts, the American discovery system functioned
reasonably well under the Federal Rules regime for approximately
65
the first thirty years. But as parties increasingly relied on U.S. courts
to address various social issues, litigation expanded well beyond what
66
the drafters of the Federal Rules could have imagined. The passage
67
of sweeping civil rights legislation, the enactment of harsher criminal
68
penalties, and the trend toward relying on private litigants instead of
69
government agencies to enforce certain laws all combined to expand
the societal role of federal and state courts and to raise the overall
volume of litigation.
Increased litigation, in turn, led to calls for still further
expansions of pretrial discovery. The Supreme Court heeded these

64. Moskowitz, supra note 31, at 604.
65. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 749 (1998)
(“Party-controlled discovery reached its high-water mark in the 1970 amendments in terms of
rule provisions.”); see also Blaner et al., supra note 40, at 8 (“Discovery reached its greatest
expanse in 1970, when the rulemakers consolidated many aspects of the discovery rules and
revamped Rule 26 to serve as a general guide to discovery.”).
66. See Blaner et al., supra note 40, at 8 (noting that the “courts were not yet an instrument
for social change” when the Federal Rules were drafted). As one expert noted, “[T]he drafters
[of the Federal Rules] would be amazed at how immense many cases now become and how
prominent a role discovery plays in that process.” Subrin, supra note 26, at 743.
67. See Ishra Solieman, Note, Born Osama: Muslim-American Employment
Discrimination, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1079–80 (2009) (“Since the passage of the Civil Rights
Act in 1964, employment-discrimination cases have been on the rise. During the 1990s, federal
court filings increased three-fold, accounting for nearly 10% of the cases filed in federal district
courts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2180–81 n.12 (1989) (noting that Judge
Richard Posner has theorized that expanding civil rights litigation was part, but not all, of the
reason federal caseloads ballooned after 1960); Blaner et al., supra note 40, at 8 (identifying
equal rights legislation as one cause of expanding caseloads).
68. See Stuart Taylor Jr., A Quiet Crisis in the Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at 23, 23
(“The courts have been deluged by criminal trials and appeals, in large part because harsh
penalties have increased defendants’ incentives to go to trial rather than plead guilty. The new
sentencing process is so complex and hypertechnical that it takes judges roughly 25 percent
more time than before.”). In an interview, Federal District Judge Jack B. Weinstein opined that
the increasing criminal caseload made it “very difficult for any judge to find the time to try civil
cases.” Kenneth P. Nolan, Weinstein on the Courts, LITIGATION, Spring 1992, at 24, 24.
69. See Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (“Congress has
elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-general as an enforcing mechanism for the antitrust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more.”).
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calls in 1970 when it empowered the Rules Drafting Committee to
70
amend the Federal Rules to lift certain restrictions. The 1970
Amendments abandoned the requirement that a party demonstrate
71
good cause before it could request the production of documents.
The Amendments also allowed parties to use discovery devices as
72
frequently as they wished. The floodgates had been opened.
E. Early Reform Efforts
The 1970 Amendments triggered an almost immediate backlash.
Broad opposition to expansive discovery emerged within only a few
73
years, as confidence in the ability of courts and litigants to manage
74
the ever-expanding discovery process began to deteriorate. The 1976
Pound Conference, which had been “convened at the behest of Chief
75
Justice Warren Burger to examine the troubled state of litigation,”
concluded,
There is a very real concern in the legal community that the
discovery process is now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions,
since any material which might lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm. Unnecessary
intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high costs to the
litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as

70. See generally Order Prescribing Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
U.S. District Courts, 398 U.S. 977 (1970) (detailing the Supreme Court’s 1970 Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment; Blaner et al., supra
note 40, at 8.
72. See supra note 71.
73. Marcus, supra note 65, at 752. The growing dissatisfaction with the discovery process in
the 1960s and 1970s is evidenced by the significant increase in the literature on the subject of
discovery and the number of conferences, reports, symposia, meetings, or studies devoted solely
or primarily to the issue of discovery problems. E.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’
Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787;
Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions:
Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873; Wayne D.
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 [hereinafter Brazil, Views from the Front Lines];
David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055
(1979); David S. Walker, Professionalism and Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 759 (1988–89); Note, Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments,
8 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 623 (1972).
74. James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M.
Pace & Mary E. Vaina, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Discovery Management: Further Analysis
of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 624 (1998).
75. Bell et al., supra note 3, at 9.
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a lever toward settlement have come to be part of some lawyers’
76
trial strategy.

The growing problems with pretrial discovery compelled state
courts, which were largely following the approaches of the Federal
Rules, to begin experimenting with discovery reform in the late
77
1970s, and prompted the American Bar Association (ABA) to
78
convene a study group to examine the problem of discovery abuse.
Based on the ABA study group’s 1980 report, the Judicial
79
Conference tightened the federal discovery rules in 1980 and 1983.
When these reforms proved inadequate, Congress passed the Civil
80
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CRJA), triggering a further round of

76. Erickson, supra note 7, at 288.
77. See PATRICIA A. EBENER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO
REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY 30 (1981) (“[C]ontrolling the pace of
discovery is an increasingly common objective of court management, and courts have placed
limits both on the scope of discovery and the time allowed for it.”). This survey found that
twenty-nine states and twenty-three of the nation’s largest metropolitan trial courts had
implemented reforms to expedite pretrial discovery, including using mail and telephone to
expedite pretrial motions, requiring attorneys to attempt to settle their discovery disputes
before requesting judicial intervention, delegating resolution of discovery motions to parajudicial employees, limiting the number of interrogatories, limiting the time allowed for
discovery, holding conferences to schedule discovery, and authorizing sanctions for frivolous
discovery motions. Id.
78. See generally ABA Section of Litig., Second Report of the Special Committee for the
Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137 (1980) (examining the problem of discovery abuse).
79. Edward D. Cavanaugh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local
Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 779–81 (1985). The 1983 Amendments prohibited redundant
discovery, required that discovery be proportional to the magnitude of the case, and mandated
court sanctions for violation of the rules. Id. at 788–90. They also explicitly provided for judicial
discussion of discovery plans at pretrial conferences and for the issuance of an order scheduling
discovery and other pretrial events. Id. at 782, 785.
80. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)). According to the legislative history underlying the
CJRA, the purpose behind the Act was “to promote for all citizens—rich or poor, individual or
corporation, plaintiff or defendant—the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes
in our Nation’s federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6802, 6804. Under the Act, each U.S. district court was required to implement a Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan under the direction of an advisory group. Id. at 13, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817. The plans served four purposes: (1) to “aid in the resolution of
civil cases on the merits”; (2) to “monitor discovery”; (3) to “enhance litigation management”;
and (4) to “assure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil matters.” Lisa J.
Trembly, Mandatory Disclosure: A Historical Review of the Adoption of Rule 26 and an
Examination of the Events That Have Transpired Since Its Adoption, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
425, 434 (1997).
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81

study and reforms. In addition, the federal discovery rules were
amended in 1993 to mandate that parties meet and prepare a
82
proposed discovery plan early in the case, and that certain relevant
information and evidence be produced regardless of whether it had
83
been requested by the opposition. The 1993 Amendments also
84
limited the number of depositions and interrogatories.
These reforms, though well intentioned, failed to stem the delay
and excessive costs that have become the hallmarks of pretrial
discovery. In fact, the discovery abuses common today differ little
85
from those that concerned the drafters of the original Federal Rules.
The frequency and severity of these abuses, however, have changed
considerably.
II. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DEEPENS THE PROBLEM
The advent of electronic discovery has significantly raised the
stakes in discovery abuse. The volume and costs of discovery in the
electronic age amount in some cases to billions of pages and millions
of dollars. Moreover, difficulties in managing and organizing
electronic data have created opportunities for significant discovery
abuse by litigants who see an opportunity to increase their opponents’
costs and thereby force a settlement of litigation regardless of merit.
These developments have pushed discovery to the forefront of
litigation concerns for American businesses.

81. The CJRA spawned a number of reforms, including mediation and arbitration in civil
cases. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Rand-ly Criticized: Congressional Court Fix Had Little Effect
on Cost and Delay, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 14, 14–16 (describing a study evaluating reforms
spawned by the CJRA). Other reforms adopted by district court judges included automatic
disclosure and limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions. Carl Tobias, Silver
Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 857, 867 (1993). Although some
have questioned whether the CJRA-inspired reforms reduced the cost or time associated with
civil discovery, the combination of methods, such as setting trial dates early and having judges
manage cases upon filing, was effective in reducing the amount of time needed to dispose of
cases. See Goldberg, supra, at 14.
82. Order Prescribing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1089,
1125 (1993).
83. Id. at 1118–21.
84. Kakalik et al., supra note 74, at 625.
85. See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—
“Much Ado About Nothing?,” 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 701 (1995) (“Interestingly, the claims of
discovery abuse and the types of abuse claimed seem to have remained relatively constant over
time, even though there have been several amendments to the discovery rules designed
specifically to cure certain types of abuse.”).
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A. Electronic Discovery Presents Unique and Urgent Challenges
1. Electronic Discovery Has Significantly Increased the Volume
and Cost of Discovery. The ascendancy of electronic discovery in
recent years has revealed the need for fundamental changes to the
86
American discovery system. Modern computer systems have
exponentially increased the number of documents that companies
87
create and retain in the normal course of business. According to
experts, 99 percent of the world’s information is now generated
88
electronically. Approximately 36.5 trillion emails are sent worldwide
89
every year, with the average employee sending or receiving 135
90
emails each day. And email traffic is only the tip of the iceberg. Each
91
day, close to 12 billion instant messages are sent worldwide.
This surge in the creation of electronic documents is especially
problematic because modern computer technology permits
companies to retain vast records almost indefinitely. In 2005,
ExxonMobil reported to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee that
it was storing 500 terabytes of electronic information in the United
92
States alone. This amounts to 250 billion typewritten pages.
Corporate defendants now face the dismaying prospect of combing
86. See Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the Discovery of ESI Since December 1,
2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, ¶ 1 (2008), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v14i3/article8.pdf (“An
explosion in the amount and discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) threatens to
clog the federal court system and make judicial determination of the substantive merits of
disputes an endangered species.”).
87. See Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L. Sternberg, In Pursuit of FRCP 1:
Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 2 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article11.pdf
(“Advances in computer software and hardware . . . have greatly increased the ability to
generate, replicate, circulate, and accumulate electronic information.”).
88. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A
VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008) (citing PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH
INFORMATION? 2003, at 1 (2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-muchinfo-2003/printable_report.pdf), available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscoveryFrontLines.pdf.
89. See Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 12 (noting that “[p]robably close to 100 billion emails
are sent daily”).
90. Press Release, LiveOffice, LiveOffice Survey Reveals Organizations Are Unprepared
for E-Discovery Requests (June 25, 2007), http://www.marketwire.com/mw/rel_us_print.jsp?
id=745509.
91. Gene J. Koprowski, Instant Messaging Grew by Nearly 20 Percent in 2005,
TECHNEWSWORLD (Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/47270.html.
92. Letter from Charles A. Beach, Coordinator, Corp. Litig., ExxonMobil Corp., to Peter
G. McCabe, Secretary, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (Feb. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-002.pdf.
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through virtually limitless caches of electronic records every time they
are threatened with litigation.
But an ever-growing volume of electronic documents is only part
of the problem. The harsh reality is that the costs of producing
electronic documents far exceed those of producing paper documents.
Unlike paper documents, electronic data must be processed and
loaded into a special database before they can even be reviewed for
93
potential relevance. Also, older electronic data are typically stored
on backup tapes, which can be singularly time-consuming and costly
to review. The data from such tapes must first be decompressed and
94
then processed into a reviewable format. Further, because the
information contained on a backup tape may be recorded in a
serpentine fashion, “the tape drive must shuttle back and forth
95
through the entire tape repeatedly to get to the data.” This shuttling
process occurs at a glacial pace when compared to the speed with
which computers normally retrieve data. Additionally, because
backup tapes often lack a directory or catalogue of the information
they contain, a party may need to search an entire tape—or perhaps
96
all of an opponent’s tapes—to locate a single file.
Restoring backup tapes for review can easily cost millions of
dollars. In one case, the defendant estimated a cost of $9.75 million to
97
restore backup tapes. The cost of reviewing backup tapes can
become higher still if the data they contain were created on obsolete
98
software or hardware, an occurrence that is far from uncommon.

93. Among other things, electronic data must be subjected to a process known as deduplication, in which identical copies of documents are removed prior to review. This process
can greatly reduce review costs.
94. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE EMERGING
CHALLENGE OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: STRATEGIES FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSES 3 (2008),
available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-Strategies.pdf (noting that “much
of the information on the backup tapes is difficult to recover, meaning it must be specially
processed or translated before it can be used”).
95. CRAIG BALL, WHAT JUDGES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DISCOVERY FROM BACKUP
TAPES 2 (2007), available at http://www.craigball.com/What_Judges_Should_Know_About_
Discovery_from_Backup_Tapes-corrected.pdf.
96. Sarah A.L. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of Electronic Data Under the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Effective Are Proposed Protections
for “Not Reasonably Accessible” Data?, 83 N.C. L. REV. 984, 991 (2005).
97. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (“If the emails on all of the back-up tapes were produced instead of a sample of eight
sessions, the total cost would mushroom to almost $9,750,000.”).
98. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 13.
Businesses often find that older data cannot be easily retrieved because they were created with
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These substantial costs have not, however, dissuaded courts from
routinely ordering defendants to restore and search backup tapes for
99
potentially responsive documents.
Further escalating the costs of electronic discovery are the
qualitative differences between electronic and paper documents. As
the drafters of the Federal Rules observed, most people adopt a more
informal style when drafting emails, text messages, and instant
messages, a practice that tends to make privilege review “more
100
difficult, and . . . correspondingly more expensive.” The casual
milieu of email and other electronic communications also gives rise to
linguistic ambiguities that further complicate the reviewer’s task.
Employees frequently devise their own abbreviations and shorthand
101
terminology for such correspondence, a convention that leaves
reviewing attorneys unable to comprehend documents without
102
guidance from the authors.
The additional costs associated with production of electronic
records can be considerable. One expert estimates the cost of
103
producing a single electronic document to be as high as $4. Verizon,
which has devoted considerable attention to electronic discovery
issues, has estimated that producing one gigabyte of data—the
104
equivalent of between 15,477 and 677,963 printed pages —costs
105
between $5,000 and $7,000. But far more than a single gigabyte of
data will often be at issue. Commentators opine that even a typical
midsize case now involves at least 500 gigabytes of data, resulting in
106
costs of $2.5 to $3.5 million for electronic discovery alone. Another
study found that from 2006 to 2008, the average surveyed company

software that is no longer in production or are stored on media that is no longer supported by
the manufacturer. Restoring this type of data is a laborious and expensive process. Id.
99. Phillips, supra note 96, at 992.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
101. See Stephanie Raposo, Quick! Tell Us What KUTGW Means, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
2009, at D1 (“In many offices, a working knowledge of text-speak is becoming de rigueur.”).
102. See Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 38 (“Thus, it is not surprising that lawyers and those
to whom they delegate search tasks may not be particularly good at ferreting out responsive
information through the use of simple keyword search terms.”). These abbreviations also
complicate the process of locating relevant documents in the first instance, as keyword searches
may not incorporate these key terms.
103. Ann G. Fort, Mandatory E-Discovery: Compliance Can Create David and Goliath
Issues, Reminiscent of the Early Days of Sarbanes-Oxley, DAILY REP., Mar. 19, 2007, at 13.
104. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 29 n.2.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id.
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spent between $621,880 and $2,993,567 per case on electronic
107
discovery. At the high end, companies in the study reported average
108
per-case discovery costs ranging from $2,354,868 to $9,759,900.
The costs of electronic discovery are continuing to rise. One
report indicates that the volume of information, including
electronically stored information, is growing at a rate of 30 percent
109
annually. The growing cache of electronic information drives up
costs, as companies are forced to cull through ever-larger stockpiles
of data to identify responsive documents. According to the influential
Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery Survey, expenditures for the
collection and processing of electronic documents in the United
States will reach $4.7 billion in 2010, an increase of 15 percent over
110
the prior year. Notably, this figure does not include the cost of
reviewing these documents for responsiveness or privilege, a process
that can comprise between 75 and 90 percent of the cost of producing
111
electronic records.
The rising costs associated with electronic discovery threaten to
112
drive all but the largest cases out of the system. A report released in
2008 by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice warns that in low-value
cases, the costs of electronic discovery “could dominate the
113
underlying stakes in dispute.” But even in large cases, the volume of
electronic information is growing so fast that traditional techniques of
114
identifying and reviewing documents are breaking under the strain.
107. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST.
LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 3 (2010), available at
http://civilconference.uscourts.gov (follow “Empirical Research, Pt. 2” hyperlink; then follow
“Litigation Cost Survey of Major Companies” hyperlink).
108. Id.
109. See LYMAN & VARIAN, supra note 88, at 2 (estimating that “new stored information
grew about 30% a year between 1999 and 2002”).
110. George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, Mining for Gold, LAW TECH. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTNC.jsp?id=1202435497600&Mining_f
or_Gold&hbxlogin=1#.
111. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, NICHOLAS M. PACE & ROBERT H. ANDERSON, RAND INST.
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:
OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 3 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_
papers/2008/RAND_OP183.pdf.
112. When Supreme Court Justice Breyer was informed at a conference several years ago
that discovery in a routine case might cost $4 million, he remarked, “We can’t do that . . . . If it
really costs millions of dollars, then you’re going to drive out of the litigation system people who
ought to be there.” Daniel Fisher, The Data Explosion: Lawyers Charge a Lot for Discovery and
Aren’t Even Very Good at It. That Spells Opportunity for H5, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2007, at 72, 73.
113. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 111, at 3.
114. Ken Withers, When E-Mail Explodes, SAN DIEGO LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 36, 37.
FOR
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Several cases have already involved more than one billion potentially
115
relevant electronic documents. Even if only 1 percent of the
documents in such cases were reviewed for possible production, it
would likely take 100 people nearly 7 months and $20 million to
116
conduct an initial review. In light of projected growth rates for
electronic documents, it may soon become too expensive for lawyers
merely to search through their clients’ computer files to identify
117
potentially responsive documents.
Electronic data also present unique challenges with regard to
collecting potentially responsive documents. Most companies have
little idea what documents exist in their computer systems or precisely
118
where those documents are located. The sheer volume of electronic
documents created by modern businesses simply makes cataloguing
or organizing the documents too difficult and expensive. The ease
with which computer records can be created further complicates
document-collection efforts. For example, employees can save huge
swaths of information on desktop computers, laptops, and portable
storage devices without anyone else’s knowledge. Merely identifying
all versions of a particular document can be inordinately difficult
because an employee may have forwarded the document to a large
number of individuals, each of whom may have edited it and saved it

115. John H. Jessen, Special Issues Involving Electronic Discovery, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 425, 428 (2000).
116. Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 20.
117. See id. ¶ 1 (noting that “it is becoming prohibitively expensive for lawyers even to
search through information”).
118. As the Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention and
Production notes,
Neither the users who created the data nor information technology personnel are
necessarily aware of the existence and locations of the copies. For instance, a word
processing file may reside concurrently on an individual’s hard drive, in a networkshared folder, as an attachment to an email, on a backup tape, in an internet cache,
and on portable media such as a CD or floppy disk. Furthermore, the location of
particular electronic files typically is determined not by their substantive content, but
by the software with which they were created, making organized retention and review
of those documents difficult.
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE
SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES
FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 2 n.5 (2007), available at http://
www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf; see also Ross
Chaffin, Comment, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and Importance
of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 123 (2006) (noting that, thanks to
email, it is entirely possible that documents and correspondence may reside in “unexpected”
places).
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119

on a personal computer. Cases in which companies have been
sanctioned for failing to locate all responsive electronic documents
120
121
abound. In Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., for example, the
plaintiff’s counsel failed to identify key emails until after trial had
122
begun, resulting in an $8.5 million sanction.
Preservation of electronic data also presents litigants with special
challenges and costs. Once a lawsuit can be reasonably anticipated,
both parties are obliged to preserve all potentially relevant
123
evidence. Although this is generally a simple task for hard-copy
documents, it poses considerable difficulties for electronic files for
several reasons: First, the sheer volume and diversity of electronic
data make preservation a challenge. Second, electronic data can be—
and, in some cases, are intended to be—ephemeral. Dynamic
databases, in which data are constantly being added, modified, and
removed, can be extremely difficult to preserve for an extended
124
period of time.
Third, computer systems typically include
housekeeping programs that automatically delete data that are no
125
longer useful. Unless suspended, these programs can destroy
relevant evidence. Fourth, certain electronic information, such as
126
127
deleted files and metadata, is not visible to normal users.
119. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 94, at 2
(“Even information you know you have—such as emails—may be more challenging to produce
because discovery requests frequently seek even slightly different copies of the same document,
and the ability to forward email easily often makes it difficult to determine how many copies
exist.”).
120. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 469–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing cases involving sanctions for
nonproduction of evidence). See generally Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., Rose Hunter Jones &
Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789
(2010) (discussing sanctions for e-discovery violations).
121. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 7), vacated in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).
122. Id. at *17.
123. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“The authority to sanction parties for spoliation arises jointly under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the court’s own inherent powers. . . . The duty to preserve attached at the time
that litigation was reasonably anticipated.”).
124. Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal EDiscovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶ 7 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/
article9.pdf.
125. See id. (“[R]outine business processes are often designed to free up storage space for
other uses without any intent to impede the preservation of potential evidence for use in
discovery.”).
126. “Metadata, commonly described as ‘data about data,’ is defined as ‘information
describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.’” Williams v.
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Although this invisible information can be the most vital evidence in
128
129
a case, it is frequently destroyed in the normal course of business.
For these reasons, the burdens (and costs) of preserving electronic
information can be extreme. As ExxonMobil noted to the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee, if a court ordered the company to
interrupt the recycling of its backup systems, the annual cost of extra
backup tapes for maintaining its electronic data in the United States
130
alone would amount to $23.76 million.
2. Electronic Discovery Has Opened New Avenues for Abuse.
The massive amount of discoverable electronic material and the
difficulties associated with its collection and preservation make
131
discovery “unpredictable and increasingly subject to abuse.”
Counsel now recognize that electronically stored information is useful
not only as a litigation tool, but also as a litigation tactic. The marked
rise in the use of spoliation claims as a tactical maneuver underscores
132
this evolution. Further, as one expert has noted, the intricacies of
modern computer systems all but guarantee that some relevant
133
electronic evidence will be lost or destroyed in any given case. This

Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)
advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment). Metadata can reveal “how, when and by whom
[a document] was collected, created, accessed, or modified and how it is formatted (including
data demographics such as size, location, storage requirements and media information).”
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT
RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES &
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE app. F
at 94 (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf.
127. When a user deletes a file, the document remains on the computer’s hard drive until
the space it occupies is needed for another document. See SHARON D. NELSON, BRUCE A.
OLSON & JOHN W. SIMEK, THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY HANDBOOK 293
(2006).
128. Kenneth Starr’s team discovered “the infamous ‘talking points’ document” on Monica
Lewinsky’s computer even though she had deleted it. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rebkin,
Electronic Discovery in Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 329
(2000).
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Notably, a document’s metadata can be
destroyed merely by opening or accessing the document. See SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING
GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., supra note 126, app. E
at 80 & n.1.
130. Letter from Charles A. Beach to Peter G. McCabe, supra note 92, at 2.
131. Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68
DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 206 (2001).
132. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 21.
133. Arthur L. Smith, Responding to the “E-Discovery Alarm,” BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct.
2007, at 27, 28.
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admittedly anecdotal observation is bolstered by a recent survey,
which found that more than 90 percent of companies have failed to
adopt procedures to preserve electronic data in the event of
134
litigation. As a result, savvy plaintiffs’ counsel have an incentive to
request some electronic documents not because they are relevant but
rather in hopes of securing a large sanction when the opposing party
135
cannot produce them. Spoliation claims have thus given plaintiffs’
attorneys a “nuclear weapon” that can be used to force large
136
organizations to settle frivolous cases.
Some commentators have attempted to refute the widely
accepted characterization of American civil discovery as
disproportionately expensive and prone to abuse. But these scholars
have erroneously asserted that claims of discovery abuse rest on
unfounded perceptions that have been exaggerated by certain
137
probusiness interests and reinforced by American media outlets.
134. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 88, at 9 (citing
James Powell, IT Dangerously Unprepared for E-Discovery, Survey Shows, ENTERPRISE SYS.
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://esj.com/articles/2007/03/20/it-dangerously-unprepared-for-ediscoverysurvey-shows.aspx).
135. Although the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a safe
harbor that precludes sanctions for electronic documents lost or destroyed through ordinary or
good-faith computer use, courts have rarely invoked this provision and have construed it
narrowly when they do. See id. at 12 (“In practice, however, the ‘safe harbor’ is vague and
difficult to work with, and consequently has rarely driven the courts’ spoliation and sanctions
analysis. Some courts have warned that the ‘safe harbor’ addresses only rule-based sanctions;
courts still retain inherent powers to impose sanctions for the loss of [electronically stored
information].” (footnote omitted)).
136. Id. at 21. The risk that electronic discovery will be used as a weapon is particularly
acute in cases such as employment disputes, in which the plaintiff possesses virtually no
discoverable information. Id. at 23.
137. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1398–99 (1994) (characterizing American “litigiousness” and “discovery abuse” as a myth that is
largely attributable to misinformation disseminated by the media); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas
E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 787
(2010) (agreeing with the “‘myth’ characterization”); see also Sorenson, supra note 85, at 702
(“In light of the attention discovery abuse has received for the last thirty years or so and the
efforts that have been made to control abuse, the intractability and persistence of the abuse
claims suggest either that the partisan incentives to engage in discovery abuse are very strong or
that perhaps many abusive discovery practices identified by commentators and judges are not
really considered abusive by a large number of lawyers.”); Peggy E. Bruggman, Reducing the
Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, PUB. L. RESEARCH INST. (1995), http://
w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.html (describing the findings of a 1978 Federal Judicial
Center study, as affirmed by a 1990–93 study by the National Center of State Courts, that
showed “that discovery abuse is not as prevalent as is otherwise assumed”); Amelia F.
Burroughs, Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 91–92 (2001) (disputing that the empirical data
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These commentators rely on empirical studies that appear to
contradict the conventional wisdom that discovery is a costly and
138
often abusive diversion from litigating the merits of a case.
According to these studies, discovery is efficient and cost-effective in
the majority of cases, and instances of abuse and runaway costs are
limited to a small number of highly complex and overly contentious
139
lawsuits. But most of these studies suffer from a common flaw: they
were conducted well before the explosion of electronic discovery
140
within the last decade. The previously unimaginable volumes of
information that are now commonplace in litigation have so shifted
the discovery landscape that findings predating the email revolution
141
are no longer valid.

on discovery rates in civil cases and resources expended on discovery adequately support a clear
finding of discovery abuse).
138. Studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center are an example. E.g., PAUL R.
CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL
CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978), available at http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/jcclpdis.pdf/$file/jcclpdis.pdf (reporting the results of a 1978
Federal Judicial Center study); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research
on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 800 (1998) (reviewing various economic and behavioral
studies on discovery and commenting that “[i]n the vast majority of cases, discovery appears to
be the self-executing system the rules contemplate”); Mullenix, supra note 137, at 1433 (arguing
that “the 1978 [Federal Judicial Center] study is important because it found that discovery abuse
was not a serious problem and consequently ended contemporaneous efforts to amend the
discovery rules”); Lee & Willging, supra note 137, at 787 (relying on the FJC study and
concluding that “discovery and overall litigation costs were largely proportionate to stakes, and
that the stakes in a case were the single best predictor of overall costs”); see also Mullenix, supra
note 137, at 1436 (“[D]iscovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate the vast
majority of federal filings.” (quoting CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 138, at 35)).
139. Willging et al., supra note 5, at 527.
140. Indeed, a 2009 study by the Federal Judicial Center confirms that litigation costs “were
higher in cases with electronic discovery . . . and in cases with more reported types of
discovery.” EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL,
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2, 35–37 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (reporting the results of a 2009 Federal Judicial
Center study).
141. Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center has acknowledged as much and has launched a new
study of the impact of electronic documents on the discovery process. See Letter from Judge
Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. for Civil Rules, to the Members
of the ABA Litig. Section (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/
survey/0709-FederalJudicialCenter.html (requesting Section members to respond to a
questionnaire on civil litigation, particularly discovery, in the federal courts).
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B. The Increased Costs of Electronic Discovery Far Outweigh Any
Benefit to Keeping the Current Discovery System
A 2008 study of the fellows of the American College of Trial
Lawyers conducted jointly by the American College of Trial Lawyers
and the University of Denver’s Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System (ACTL-IAALS Report) confirms that
efforts to rein in discovery costs and end discovery abuse have
generally failed. The ACTL-IAALS Report concluded unequivocally
142
that “[o]ur discovery system is broken.”
The report further
determined that some meritorious cases are never filed because “the
cost of pursuing them fails a rational cost-benefit test,” and that cases
of “questionable merit and smaller cases are settled rather than tried
143
because it costs too much to litigate them.” Nearly 71 percent of the
respondents believe “that discovery is used as a tool to force
144
settlement,” and nearly half of the respondents feel that “discovery
145
is abused in every case.” The ACTL-IAALS Report also makes
clear that electronic discovery has greatly exacerbated the cost and
delay already inherent in the discovery process. The report concludes
146
that “[e]lectronic discovery . . . needs a serious overhaul.” In fact, 75
percent of the respondents surveyed in the ACTL-IAALS Report
agreed that “discovery costs, as a share of total litigation costs, have
increased disproportionately due to the advent of [electronic
147
discovery].” Even more respondents, 87 percent, said that electronic
148
discovery “increases the costs of litigation.” One of the survey’s
149
respondents described electronic discovery as a “morass.”
To the extent discovery is intended to aid the search for truth,
these costs are not being offset by any discernible benefit. A 2008
142. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., supra note 12, at 9.
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id. at 9.
145. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM app. A at A-4 (2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.
actl.com/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3650.
146. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., supra note 12, at 2.
147. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., supra note 145, app. A at A-4.
148. Id.
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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survey of Fortune 200 companies found that, in cases with total
litigation costs of more than $250,000, the ratio of the average
number of discovery pages to the average number of exhibit pages—
that is, pages actually utilized in some fashion at trial—was 1,044 to
150
1. Similarly, in one survey of attorneys in Chicago, practitioners
estimated that 60 percent of discovery materials did not justify the
151
cost associated with obtaining them. The Chicago study revealed
that in more than 50 percent of complex cases, the opposition’s
152
discovery efforts had failed to disclose significant evidence. This
result led the study’s author to wonder whether the civil discovery
system is functioning acceptably when, “with considerable
inefficiency and at great cost, it distributes information among the
153
parties fairly evenly in less than half of the larger cases.”
C. Discovery Now Ranks as a Top Litigation Concern for Major
Corporate Defendants
The unchecked rise in discovery costs has attracted the attention
of corporations, which now list discovery as one of their most pressing
154
concerns when litigation is imminent. This concern is well founded.
Discovery costs in U.S. commercial litigation are growing at an
explosive rate; estimates indicate they reached $700 million in 2004,
155
$1.8 billion in 2006, and $2.9 billion in 2007. And these figures do
not even account for the billions of dollars that corporations pay each
year to settle frivolous lawsuits because the burdens of litigating until
summary judgment or a favorable verdict are too onerous.
The costs of tort litigation in the United States also drive up the
costs to consumers of purchasing a variety of goods. A study
conducted in 2002 by the president’s Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) concluded that the direct and indirect costs of excessive tort
litigation in the United States drive up production costs, which must

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 107, app. at 16.
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 73, at 230 n.24.
Id. at 234.
Id.
See FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, THIRD ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY
FINDINGS 18 (2006), available at http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/2006/Fulbrights
ThirdAnnualLitigationTrendsSurveyFindings.pdf (reporting that 81 percent of 422 international
companies surveyed felt that they were not “well-prepared” for electronic discovery issues).
155. Robert H. Thornburg, Electronic Discovery in Florida, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2006, at 34, 34;
Leigh Jones, Faced with Data Explosion, Firms Tap Temp Attorneys, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 14, 2005),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1128947761813.
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156

ultimately be borne by consumers and employees. The recent
survey of Fortune 200 companies found that their U.S. litigation costs
ate up 0.51 percent of their U.S.-derived revenue, while their foreign
litigation costs consumed a mere 0.06 percent of their non-U.S.
157
revenue in 2008. The CEA has concluded that these additional costs
impose a 2 percent tax on consumer prices and a 3 percent tax on
158
wages. Inasmuch as discovery costs comprise the majority of
159
litigation expenses, discovery abuse is primarily responsible for this
160
litigation tax. And with the rapid escalation of discovery costs in the
electronic age, this tax is set to increase considerably.
The litigation tax has a number of adverse effects on the
American economy. First, it hampers productivity and innovation.
Research shows that corporations expecting high litigation costs will
forgo research and withhold new products from the market to
161
conserve funds for legal expenses.
Indeed, under financial
accounting rules applicable in the United States, public companies are
obligated to create financial reserves when potential legal liabilities
162
become sufficiently certain.
These litigation reserves divert
significant funds from productive uses and can even drive major
163
corporations into the red. Further, the discovery-related delays
156. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS? AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 13 (2002), available at
http://www.heartland.org/custom/semod_policybot/pdf/13266.pdf (reasoning that litigation costs
will “ultimately be borne by individuals through job loss or a reduction in wages (workers), [or]
an increase in consumer prices (consumers)”).
157. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 107, at 13 fig.9.
158. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 156, at 1.
159. See Richard K. Herrman, Vincent J. Poppiti & David K. Sheppard, Managing
Discovery in a Digital Age: A Guide to Electronic Discovery in the District of Delaware, 8 DEL.
L. REV. 75, 75 (2005) (“Discovery traditionally proves to be the most expensive aspect of
litigation.”).
160. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 156, at 1, 7 (using the term “litigation
tax” because “[t]o the extent that tort claims are economically excessive, they act like a tax on
individuals and firms”).
161. See John Engler & Lawrence J. McQuillan, Op-Ed., Limiting Lawsuit Abuses Lowers
Costs from Litigation, Creates Jobs in Long Run, DETROIT NEWS, May 14, 2008, at 15A (“Fear
of lawsuits . . . causes companies to withhold beneficial products from markets . . . .”).
162. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARD NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES ¶ 8 (1975). Under this standard, a
company must create a litigation loss reserve if a loss is “probable” and the amount of the
expected loss is material and reasonably estimable. Id.
163. See Ruthie Ackerman, Hutchinson Hit by Litigation Charge, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2008,
6:30 PM ET), http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/30/hutchinson-technology-diskdrive-marketsequity-cx-ra-0130markets27.html (reporting that Hutchinson posted a $2.5 million charge to
settle class-action litigation); Steven E.F. Brown, Lawsuit Settlement Pushes McKesson to $20M
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endemic to the American civil litigation system indicate that such
economic deprivation can last for a considerable period.
The litigation tax also hampers the international competitiveness
of U.S. companies, a crucial handicap in this era of increasing
globalization. The U.S. tort liability system is now the most expensive
164
in the world. Costs associated with tort claims have risen almost
165
continuously since 1950. As a percentage of GDP, tort costs in the
United States are triple those in France and at least double those in
166
Germany and Japan. Even the United Kingdom, after whose system
of jurisprudence the American system was modeled, is seen by
foreign investors as having a “significant cost advantage compared to
167
the United States.”
Finally, the litigation tax and the uncertainties inherent in the
U.S. tort liability system dissuade foreign companies from opening
168
factories and otherwise doing business in the United States. This is a
keenly felt loss in an era of economic retrenchment and declining
employment. One report goes so far as to conclude that rising

Loss, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009), http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/
2009/01/26/daily12.html (reporting that McKesson Corp. took a $493 million charge to settle
pending litigation and create a reserve against future claims); Sherri Begin Welch, Kelly Services
Blames Litigation Charge for 3Q Loss, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Nov. 14, 2008, 2:46 PM),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20081114/FREE/811149958 (noting that absent the $22.5
million litigation charge, Kelly Services’s CEO said the company would have had a small
quarterly profit); Xerox Posts Loss on Litigation Charge, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at 4
(reporting that Xerox took a $491 million charge to cover the costs of a lawsuit).
164. See Ted Frank, A Stimulus You Can Believe In, THE AMERICAN (May 29, 2009),
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/may-2009/a-stimulus-you-can-believe-in (“The direct
costs to the United States of tort litigation are $252 billion a year, 1.8 percent of GNP, twice that
of a typical industrialized nation.”).
165. TILLINGHAST, TOWERS PERRIN, 2006 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 5 (2006),
available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2006/200611/
Tort_2006_FINAL.pdf.
166. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE U.S. LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT: SUPPORTING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS BY REDUCING LEGAL COSTS AND
UNCERTAINTY 1 (2008), available at http://www.locationusa.com/USDepartmentOfCommerce/
pdf/litigationFDI.pdf.
167. Id. at 4. Lord Leonard Hoffman, explaining why even the United Kingdom has lower
tort costs than the United States, identifies several reasons—namely, “no punitive damages,
limits on pain and suffering, no contingency fees, loser pays, no juries in most civil cases, and a
trial bar with almost no political influence.” Id.
168. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 166, at 5–6 (noting survey data indicating
that the litigation environment “is likely to impact important business decisions . . . such as
where to locate or do business” and describing studies showing international investor concerns
with the U.S. legal environment); Philip Howard, Beyond Tort Reform, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 5, 2007,
at 9 (“Foreign companies are being scared away in part . . . by soaring costs of American law.”).
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litigation costs are even threatening the preeminence of the U.S.
169
securities markets.
III. RECENT EFFORTS TO CURB DISCOVERY ABUSE
Growing anxiety over the rapidly escalating costs and delay
endemic to discovery in civil litigation has spawned two attempts over
the last decade to reform federal discovery rules. These reforms
included limiting the scope of discovery and addressing the new
challenges posed by electronic documents. Unfortunately, both
reform efforts have proven largely ineffectual.
A. The 2000 Amendments
Prior to 2000, parties were entitled to discovery into “any
matter . . . relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
170
action.” But in 2000, amendments to the Federal Rules were
introduced, seeking to narrow this broad scope of permissible
171
discovery by establishing a new, two-tiered discovery protocol.
Under this new protocol, parties are initially entitled to discover only
172
information that is “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”
Only if such discovery is inadequate may a court, “[f]or good cause,”
permit discovery into “any matter relevant to the subject matter
173
involved in the action.” The two-tiered procedure was designed to
prevent parties from using discovery “to develop new claims and
174
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings.”
The other main change effected by the 2000 Amendments
involved pretrial disclosures—early disclosures that are intended to
clarify what documents each party has and to diminish the need for
formal discovery requests. Prior to 2000, courts could promulgate
local rules setting forth whether parties were required to make initial
disclosures. More than half of the federal district courts opted out of
imposing the requirement, resulting in a “patchwork and fragmented

169. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND
US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 75–77 (2006), available at http://www.
nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1993) (amended 2000) (emphasis added).
171. See Order Prescribing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 529 U.S.
1155, 1165 (1999) (amending Rule 26(b)(1) to create a two-tiered discovery system).
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
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175

To unify these divergent approaches, the 2000
system.”
Amendments implemented two changes. First, they required all
parties (except in specified types of cases) to make initial disclosures,
176
unless the parties agree or the court orders otherwise. Second, they
limited the information that must be disclosed to that which the
177
disclosing party may use to support its position.
Like their predecessors, the 2000 Amendments failed to rein in
178
abusive discovery practices. The bench and bar have largely ignored
the Amendments’ limitation on the scope of discovery, clinging
179
instead to entrenched notions of liberal information gathering. The
reasons are numerous, but they stem in large part from an inability to
discern a meaningful difference between the pre- and post-2000
discovery standards. Attempting to distinguish between information
relevant to “the subject matter of the dispute” and information
relevant to “a claim or defense” has been dismissed by one court as
“the juridical equivalent to debating the number of angels that can

175. Peter J. Beshar & Kathryn E. Nealon, Changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 2000, at 1.
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2006) & advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment.
177. See id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (explaining that initial disclosure
obligation issues unrelated to expert witness testimony have “been narrowed to identification of
witnesses and documents that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses”).
178. In one sense, this should come as no surprise, given that the drafters of these
amendments “determined expressly not to review the question of discovery abuse.”
Memorandum from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192
F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000); see also AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 10 (noting that two-thirds of
respondents believe that the amendments to the Federal Rules between 1976 and 2006 have not
remedied the problem of discovery abuse).
179. See Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of
Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 126 (2005)
(“What has been my experience with the concept of bifurcated discovery under the 2000
amendment? (1) Attorneys do not as a general rule attempt to limit discovery to that which is
relevant to a claim or defense; and (2) attorneys do not as a general rule address the existence of
good cause, either to argue for broader discovery as Rule 26(b)(1) contemplates or to counter
such arguments.”); Noyes, supra note 11, at 61 (“[D]espite the 2000 amendments, the Rule has
been ignored.”); Noyes, supra note 11, at 67 (“Instead, many lower courts have acknowledged
the 2000 amendments but have interpreted them as having changed nothing.”); Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil
Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 24–25 (2001) (“First, in nearly all instances it appears that the
outcomes would have been the same under either version of the rule; indeed, it is striking how
little the courts’ opinions reflect any apparent serious effort by parties who are resisting
discovery to make anything out of this new and perhaps still unfamiliar scope definition.”).
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180

dance on the head of a pin.” The 2000 Amendments also fail to
provide any practical guidance as to when good cause exists for
broadening discovery to include information relevant to the subject
181
matter of the dispute. Without such guidance, courts have generally
ignored the two-tiered discovery system and applied the more
182
familiar pre-2000 discovery standard. As a result, plaintiffs can still
routinely engage in fishing expeditions and compel the production of
documents and information that are only tangentially related to the
183
claims or defenses at issue.

180. Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001).
181. See Beckerman, supra note 15, at 541 (“[The amendment] offers no assistance in
determining what constitutes ‘good cause’ that should be sufficient for a judge to justify granting
discovery relevant to the subject matter of the action rather than simply to the claims and
defenses of the parties.”).
182. See Saket v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02 C 3453, 2003 WL 685385, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28,
2003) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate liberal discovery, and ‘relevancy’
under Rule 26 is extremely broad.”); Richmond v. UPS Serv. Parts Logistics, No. IP01-1412-CK/H, 2002 WL 745588, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25, 2002) (“The implementation of amended Rule
26 did not necessarily impact the so called ‘liberal discovery’ standard as evidenced by cases
interpreting the post-amendment rule.”); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 263, 265 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) do
not dramatically alter the scope of discovery . . . .”); Noyes, supra note 11, at 61 (“[D]espite the
2000 amendments, the Rule has been ignored.”). But see United States ex rel. Stewart v.
Louisiana Clinic, No. Civ.A. 99-1767, 2003 WL 21283944, at *8 (E.D. La. June 4, 2003)
(emphasizing that the 2000 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) narrowed the scope of discovery);
Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp., No. 01 CIV.8115(MBM)(FM), 2002 WL 31235717, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2002) (upholding the denial of a discovery request and distinguishing a case
allowing broad discovery on the ground that the 2000 Amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) had
narrowed the scope of discovery); Hill v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490, 492–93 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(emphasizing that after the 2000 Amendments, “Rule 26(b)(1) now focuses discovery on the
actual claims and defenses at issue in the case” and denying a discovery request because the
documents sought would have been relevant only to a discriminatory-impact claim, not to the
plaintiff’s discriminatory-treatment claim).
183. In Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679 (D. Kan. 2001), for example, an individual
plaintiff sought discovery from the broker defendants in a securities fraud suit seeking proceeds
data for a six-year period. Id. at 688–89. The defendants, however, argued the only relevant time
period was the one year when the plaintiff contemplated and purchased the stock. Id. at 689.
Ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court declared its understanding of the scope of discovery in
light of the new standard: “Relevancy is broadly construed, and . . . discovery should be allowed
unless it is clear that the information sought can have no possible bearing on the claim or
defense of a party.” Id. (emphasis omitted and added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, in Bryant v. Farmers Insurance Co., No. 01-02390-CM, 2002 WL 1796045 (D. Kan.
July 31, 2002), the plaintiff in an age and gender discrimination suit sought disciplinary and
audit information regarding not only the supervisor in question, but also other supervisors and
employees. Id. at *3. Rejecting the defendant’s claims that the requests were overbroad and not
limited in scope, the court stated that relevancy is established “under the amended rule if there
is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, plaintiffs have found it easy to circumvent the
limitations imposed by the 2000 Amendments. For example, those
amendments did not modify Federal Rule 11(b)(3), which provides
that, by signing a court pleading, plaintiffs’ attorneys certify that the
pleading’s “factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
184
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” This
language essentially allows plaintiffs to make unfounded allegations if
they will likely be able to develop support for them through
discovery. Consequently, plaintiffs need only assert strategic claims to
broaden discovery in any way they deem advantageous. The
discovery system established by the 2000 Amendments thus continues
to foster discovery abuse by encouraging plaintiffs to assert
185
borderline claims to expand the scope of discovery.
Moreover, even the 2000 Amendments’ two-tiered approach to
the scope of discovery has been largely ineffectual in preventing
186
discovery abuse by plaintiffs. The case law so far suggests that the
187
second tier’s good-cause element is an obstacle in name only, such
that plaintiffs are frequently able to convince the court that they
should be entitled to the traditional subject-matter scope of discovery.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (emphasis added).
185. See, e.g., CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS—PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: CIVIL
RULES REGARDING DISCOVERY 90 (1998–99), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Summary_CV_Comments_1998_1999.pdf (“[This change] will . . . put
pressure on lawyers to assert thin or borderline frivolous claims or defenses. . . . Under the
current rules plaintiff would file a breach of contract suit and take discovery about the
possibility of fraud. Under the amended rule, one is pushing the plaintiff’s lawyer into treading
close to the Rule 11 line to file a fraud claim as a predicate for discovery.”).
186. See Christopher Frost, Note, The Sound and the Fury or the Sound of Silence?:
Evaluating the Pre-Amendment Predictions and Post-Amendment Effects of the Discovery
Scope-Narrowing Language in the 2000 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1), 37 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1071 (2003) (demonstrating that a plaintiff could use the goodcause provision to overcome a defendant’s relevancy-based challenge to an overbroad discovery
request).
187. See Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 WL 503045, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2001)
(“The minimal showings of relevance and admissibility hardly pose much of an obstacle for an
inquiring party to overcome, even considering the recent amendment to Rule 26(b)(1).”);
Thompson v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md. 2001) (warning
counsel that taking a “rigid view of the narrowed scope of discovery . . . would run counter to
the underlying purpose of the rule changes”). In Sanyo Laser Products, Inc. v. Arista Records,
Inc., 214 F.R.D. 496 (S.D. Ind. 2003), the court granted subject-matter discovery without a
meaningful discussion of how the requesting party demonstrated good cause. Id. at 500–02.
Instead, the court highlighted that the 2000 rule change, “while meaningful, [was] not dramatic,
and broad discovery remains the norm.” Id. at 500.

BEISNER IN FINAL.DOC

11/29/2010 6:52:13 PM

2010] REFORM OF THE CIVIL DISCOVERY PROCESS

581

The 2000 Amendments’ other principal change—namely,
mandating initial disclosures—has not had any noticeable impact,
188
particularly in complex cases when abuse and delay are most severe.
This should come as no surprise. Critics have long observed that
mandatory disclosure requirements can lead to the “overproduction
of marginally relevant information,” thus increasing delay and
189
expenses for both sides, particularly at the very beginning of a case.
Such “front-loading” of costs has the potential to “impede
190
settlement.”
B. The 2006 Amendments
The Federal Rules were amended again in 2006, this time to
191
address the growing importance—and cost—of electronic discovery.
To alleviate the burdens imposed by electronic discovery, the 2006
Amendments implemented a two-tiered proportionality approach to
192
the scope of electronic discovery. As an initial matter, a party does
not need to produce electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as “not reasonably accessible because of
193
undue burden or cost.” This includes, for example, electronic
194
information stored on backup tapes or in offline legacy systems,
which can be time-consuming and expensive to restore. If a party
wishes to obtain discovery of electronic data that are not reasonably
195
accessible, the requesting party must demonstrate “good cause.”

188. See Edward D. Cavanaugh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 886 (2008) (noting that mandatory automatic disclosure
“never fulfilled its potential”).
189. E.g., Bell, supra note 3, at 41.
190. Michael J. Wagner, Too Much, Too Costly, Too Soon? The Automatic Disclosure
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 468, 477 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
191. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 22–28 (2005), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/
2006Amendments/ST09-2005.pdf.
192. See Order Prescribing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 547 U.S.
1233, 1242 (2006) (amending Rule 26(b)(1) to create a two-tiered “proportional” discovery
system).
193. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
194. Legacy systems are older computer systems not connected to an entity’s current
computer network.
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). The Advisory Committee’s notes include several examples
of data that are not reasonably accessible, including information stored only for disasterrecovery purposes—for example, backup tapes—legacy data, and information that was deleted
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The good-cause analysis incorporates a proportionality standard,
requiring a court to “balance the costs and potential benefits of
196
discovery.”
The 2006 Amendments also attempted to ease the burdens of
preserving electronic information. To achieve this goal, the
Amendments created a safe harbor provision, under which the
destruction of electronic data through “routine, good-faith” business
procedures—such as an email system that automatically deletes old
emails after a certain period—cannot be sanctioned as spoliation
197
unless there are “exceptional circumstances.”
Third, the 2006 Amendments sought to address the tremendous
burden of reviewing unprecedented volumes of documents for
privilege. The Amendments attempted to ease this burden by
allowing the parties to agree beforehand that the inadvertent
production of privileged materials does not automatically waive the
198
privilege.
It may still be too early to gauge the effectiveness of the 2006
199
Amendments, but, for a number of reasons, many experts believe
these changes will prove no more successful than the 2000
Amendments. First, the 2006 Amendments suffer from the same fatal
flaws that undermined the 2000 Amendments—in particular the
200
failure to define the term “good cause.” This omission leaves courts
and practitioners alike with no useful guidance when grappling with
whether discovery of data that are not reasonably accessible is
201
appropriate. Moreover, a similar proportionality requirement was
incorporated into Rule 26 in the early 1980s in a futile effort to rein in
the abuses that had become rampant in the wake of the “photocopier
and is retrievable only with forensic techniques. Id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006
amendment.
196. Id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
199. See DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 111, at 11–12 (noting the lack of studies on the
effects of the 2006 Amendments and proposing options for further research).
200. Noyes, supra note 11, at 71–72.
201. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 905 (2009)
(“[T]he main problem with [the 2006 Amendments] is not that they are old news. Rather, the
problem is that such limits [referring to the 2006 Amendment’s cost-benefit proportionality
approach] never have worked terribly well and appear unlikely to work well for e-discovery.”);
Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 167, 181 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/82.pdf (describing the
need to consider the “human costs” of discovery requests).
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202

revolution” of the late 1960s. Having proven largely ineffective in
dealing with traditional discovery issues, a proportionality
requirement can hardly be expected to have a significant impact on
203
the far larger and more complex world of electronic discovery. In
reality, courts have historically ignored proportionality concerns,
instead blaming companies for choosing to employ computer systems
204
that make retrieving records more difficult or expensive. These
courts reason that, having benefited from the day-to-day convenience
of modern computer systems, companies cannot complain when they
205
must incur additional expenses to meet their discovery obligations.
This is a Hobson’s choice, as competitive pressures leave companies
no realistic alternative to utilizing modern computer systems.
The 2006 Amendments also do not insulate defendants from the
rising costs associated with electronic discovery. In fact, the 2006
Amendments arguably worsen the problem by building additional
206
costs into each case. In particular, the Federal Rules’ requirement
that parties produce electronically stored information that is not
reasonably accessible if the opposing party demonstrates good cause
could have deleterious effects. Specifically, this rule encourages
plaintiffs to seek broad electronic discovery from sources from which
retrieving information will be costly, and to invent reasons why such
information is necessary or reasonably accessible. The rules thus
provide plaintiffs with an additional discovery mechanism to drive up
the costs of litigation for defendants.
Critics of the 2006 Amendments have also expressed misgivings
about the usefulness of the safe harbor provision that protects parties
from sanctions if they destroy electronic data through “routine, good207
faith” business procedures. This provision provides no guidance

202. Moss, supra note 201, at 899–900.
203. Id. at 905.
204. Id. at 900–01.
205. See Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct.
June 16, 1999) (“To permit a corporation . . . to reap the business benefits of such technology
and simultaneously use that technology as a shield in litigation would lead to incongruous and
unfair results.”); see also Kaufman v. Kinko’s, Inc., No. 18894-NC, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2
(Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002) (“Upon installing a data storage system, it must be assumed that at
some point in the future one may need to retrieve the information previously stored.”).
206. Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Litigation—Where Did It Go off Track?, LITIGATION,
Summer 2008, at 62.
207. See Willoughby et al., supra note 120, at 828 (noting that only thirty federal court
decisions have cited the safe harbor provision between its promulgation on December 1, 2006,
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regarding what data must be preserved or the manner in which they
208
must be maintained. Further, the circumstances under which
sanctions may be imposed are vague and discretionary. Some experts,
for example, posit that the safe harbor provision would not apply in
the absence of a formal discovery order or when judges are exercising
209
their inherent power to manage cases.
In light of these
uncertainties, companies facing even small lawsuits have little
recourse but to continue to expend vast sums to preserve all
potentially relevant evidence.
These numerous shortcomings indicate that, like the 2000
Amendments, the 2006 Amendments will not effect a radical shift in
210
the case law.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Part IV offers five reform proposals that aim to address the root
causes of discovery abuse in the United States, taking into account
the lessons learned from prior discovery-reform efforts. The goal of
these proposals is to diminish incentives for engaging in discovery
abuse and to increase court involvement in preventing potentially
abusive discovery. Although some of these reforms will require
amendments to the Federal Rules, others can be implemented by
judges immediately—and have already been adopted by some courts.
A. Establish Clear Guidelines for Cost Shifting for
Electronic Discovery
The most pernicious problem with the American discovery
system is that it incentivizes parties to seek overbroad and
and January 1, 2010—and of those, only “approximately two cases per year have met its
requirements”).
208. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 111, at 11.
209. Id.
210. See id., supra note 111, at 11 (“[D]espite the sweeping nature of these changes
[referring to the 2006 Amendments], even some of the most ardent proponents of the new rules
(typically from the corporate community) argue that they do not go far enough.”); Richard L.
Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 660
(2006) (“[The 2006 Amendments] should contribute to the handling of this form of discovery,
but they will hardly revolutionize it. Indeed, one strong objection to adopting several of them
was that they don’t really add a great deal to the current rules.”); Phillips, supra note 96, at 986
(“Despite the protective language proposed for addition to Rule 26(b)(2), the amendment
offers electronic data identified as not reasonably accessible no greater protection from
discovery than the current version of the Rule provides because the good cause requirement in
the proposed amendment is not strict enough.”).
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211

burdensome discovery. The drafters of the Federal Rules have
already recognized this issue, but their efforts to remedy the problem
have failed. Attorneys continue to seek large numbers of documents
and, especially, electronic data that bear only tangentially on the
claims or defenses at issue, simply to burden the other side and
improve the requesting party’s prospect of a favorable settlement.
As discussed previously, the ubiquity of modern computer
systems—and the ever-growing caches of information they contain—
has led to a tremendous surge in the costs of electronic discovery. To
check these rising costs and the abusive discovery tactics they have
fostered, the Federal Rules should require courts to consider cost
shifting whenever a party seeks electronic discovery. Such a
requirement would place the burden of unusually large or tangential
discovery requests on the party making the request, thereby creating
incentives for parties to make requests that are better calculated to
lead to the discovery of relevant evidence.
The rules should also set forth a series of factors for courts to
consider in deciding whether cost shifting is warranted. A good
starting point for establishing these factors is the opinion by Judge
212
Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
which
identified the following considerations:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover
relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available
to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive
to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
213

7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

211. See Bruggman, supra note 137 (describing several factors that incentivize discovery
abuse).
212. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
213. Id. at 322.
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Courts could also be directed to consider the factors set forth in the
214
American Bar Association’s Civil Discovery Standards. Adopting a
specific standard based on these or similar factors would help courts
make cost-shifting decisions using identifiable criteria and would go a
long way toward addressing the shortcomings of prior efforts to curb
discovery abuses, which relied on nebulous standards such as good
cause for seeking burdensome discovery.
Finally, parties requesting production of electronic documents
that are not reasonably accessible should be required to bear the costs
of doing so. In particular, parties seeking data from backup tapes and
215
other forms of disaster-recovery media should be made to bear the
costs of retrieving, reviewing, and producing this information. This
216
has been the rule for some time in Texas, which has enjoyed
considerable success in limiting discovery costs. Such a requirement
would represent a significant step in reducing discovery abuse in
connection with electronic discovery.

214. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS (2004), available at http://
www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf. These factors
include
A. The burden and expense of the discovery, considering among other factors the
total cost of production . . . compared to the amount in controversy; B. The need for
the discovery, including the benefit to the requesting party and the availability of the
information from other sources; C. The complexity of the case and the importance of
the issues; D. The need to protect the attorney-client privilege or attorney work
product . . . ; E. The need to protect trade secrets, proprietary, or confidential
information; F. Whether the information or the software needed to access it is
proprietary or constitutes confidential business information; G. The breadth of the
discovery request; H. Whether efforts have been made to confine initial production to
tranches or subsets of potentially responsive data; . . . J. Whether the requesting party
has offered to pay some or all of the discovery expenses; K. The relative ability of
each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; L. The resources of each party as
compared to the total cost of production; M. Whether responding to the request
would impose the burden or expense of acquiring or creating software to retrieve
potentially responsive electronic data or otherwise require the responding party to
render inaccessible electronic information accessible, where the responding party
would not do so in the ordinary course of its day-to-day use of the information; . . . O.
Whether the responding party stores electronic information in a manner that is
designed to make discovery impracticable or needlessly costly or burdensome in
pending or future litigation, and [is] not justified by any legitimate personal, business,
or other non-litigation-related reasons; and P. Whether the responding party has
deleted, discarded or erased electronic information after litigation was commenced or
after the responding party was aware that litigation was probable . . . .
Id. standards 29b.iv.A–P.
215. Disaster-recovery systems are systems designed to deal with and prevent IT downtime.
216. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (requiring the party who makes unreasonable discovery
requests to pay for the discovery).
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B. Adopt the English Rule for Discovery Disputes
The current discovery problems can be traced in large part to the
217
American rule, which generally requires parties to bear their own
litigation costs, including the costs of discovery disputes. The
American rule is perhaps the greatest single catalyst of discovery
abuse, because it allows plaintiffs to impose tremendous costs on
218
defendants at virtually no cost to themselves.
The perverse
incentives to which the American rule gives rise have been
exacerbated considerably in recent years by the rising costs associated
with electronic discovery. The American rule also encourages fishing
expeditions because nothing dissuades plaintiffs from requesting
virtually limitless volumes of documents and evidence. In addition,
the American rule contributes to excessive discovery by encouraging
parties to request information and documents from opposing parties
rather than undertaking their own investigative efforts.
In contrast to the American rule, the English rule requires the
219
losing party to pay the winning party’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.
This rule, designed to dissuade meritless lawsuits, was rejected in the
220
United States because of its propensity to limit access to the courts.
But the English rule could be adopted in the limited context of
discovery disputes, such that the losing party in any discovery dispute
217. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (noting that “the
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests”).
218. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New
Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 680, 726 (1983) (“[A]
party can have as much discovery as it wants by paying only the costs of seeking that discovery;
the costs of compliance are generally borne without recompense by the opposing party.”).
219. CPR 44.3(2) (U.K.) (“If the court decides to make an order about costs . . . the general
rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party . . . .”);
CPR 44.4(1) (U.K.) (establishing that the court will not “allow costs which have been
unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount”).
220. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a “Better Way”:
Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 887 (“No one should be too
surprised that in a society with fairly strong emphasis on easy access to the courts, the virtually
unique American rule, particularly its aspect that denies recovery to prevailing defendants, has
retained fairly strong roots.”). The author articulates several negative effects of the English rule,
including that it “may excessively discourage the pressing of plausible but not clearly winning
claims, particularly when the prospective plaintiffs are strongly risk averse.” Id. at 888. The
author notes that “[t]his effect is especially likely to fall heavily on middle class people with
something to lose but not so many assets that they can tolerably afford to lose much.” Id.; see
also Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 66 (1997) (“The demerit of
this English rule in its application to final judgments is that it unduly chills the assertion of
claims and defenses.”).
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has to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred by the other side in litigating
221
that particular dispute. This limited risk of having to pay an
adversary’s fees is much less likely to close courthouse doors. At the
same time, however, application of the English rule to discovery
disputes would serve to ensure that neither party adopts an irrational
position with regard to discovery issues. Further, the risk of having to
pay the opposing party’s expenses for contesting a discovery request
would help attorneys resist clients who urge them to adopt
222
unreasonable positions. The rules should therefore be revised to
mandate that the losing party in a discovery dispute bear the
opposing party’s attorneys’ fees for that dispute.
C. Define Preservation Obligations Early in the Litigation Process
With the increasing prevalence of electronically stored
information, data preservation has become one of the costliest aspects
of litigation, in terms of both the expense of maintaining the physical
media on which the data are stored and the expense of fighting
spoliation motions. To mitigate these costs, the rules should require
that the parties meet to discuss preservation issues as early as
possible, even before the pretrial conference mandated by Rule 16
223
And to ensure that preservation
and its state counterparts.
obligations are successfully defined at these early meetings, the rules
should further mandate that the court hold an electronic-data
conference early in the case if the parties cannot reach an agreement
on their respective preservation obligations. Such early resolution
would provide a significant advantage over waiting until the pretrial
conference to address preservation issues. The parties’ preservation
obligations begin as soon as the suit can reasonably be anticipated,
but pretrial conferences typically do not take place until several
months after a case has been filed. By that time, the defendant, with
only the complaint’s broad allegations to serve as a guide, has been
224
forced to guess at the extent of its preservation obligations. This

221. See Carrington, supra note 220, at 66 (noting that the disadvantages of the English rule
in the broader litigation context would be an advantage in the discovery context, helping to
discourage discovery disputes).
222. Id.
223. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., supra note 12, at 12–14.
224. See id. (noting that the parties’ obligation to “preserve all material that may prove
relevant during a civil action, including electronic information. . . . is very difficult, if not
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uncertainty puts a defendant in a bind. On the one hand, the
defendant could err on the side of caution, preserving excessive
numbers of documents and amounts of data. On the other hand, the
defendant could preserve a narrower swath of information based on
assumptions about the scope of the suit. But in doing so, the
defendant would expose itself to possible sanctions. Defendants
typically opt for the former approach, which produces significant
costs and waste. Mandating early clarification of preservation
obligations would avoid this waste.
Moreover, the Federal Rules should make clear that parties’
preservation obligations do not extend to every last document or
225
electronic file in their possession.
Rather, the rules should
emphasize that “[r]esorting to sources that are not reasonably
accessible, while certainly possible under some circumstances, should
be required only on a showing of good cause, with the requesting
party bearing the burden to show good cause on a motion to compel
226
or in a hearing on a protective order.” The rules should also provide
that, if a party desires its opponent to preserve inaccessible forms of
electronic data, such as backup tapes and metadata, the party must
227
demonstrate a particularized need for this information. Finally,
parties requesting the preservation of inaccessible data should be
made to bear the reasonable costs of doing so. These modest changes
would cabin the costs of document-preservation efforts and ensure
that parties do not make outlandish demands for document
preservation simply as a tool to oppress their opponents in litigation.

impossible . . . in an environment in which litigants maintain enormous stores of electronic
records”).
225. In fact, a number of district courts have adopted local rules requiring the parties to
discuss preservation issues. See, e.g., Default Standard for Discovery of Electronic Documents
(“E-Discovery”), DIST. OF DEL., U.S. DIST. COURT, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/Announce/
HotPage21.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (establishing default standards for discovery of
electronic documents when parties were unable to proceed on a consensual basis).
226. SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD.,
supra note 118, at 45.
227. The Federal Rules make clear that a party can move for a protective order to clarify its
preservation obligations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“On motion to compel discovery or
for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information
is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”). My proposal would shift the
burden to the requesting party to demonstrate a need for preserving otherwise inaccessible data,
rather than requiring parties to preserve all potentially relevant information unless and until
they can convince the court that the cost and burden of doing so are unwarranted.
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D. Limit Sanctions for Failure to Preserve Electronic Documents
Only to Cases of Intentional Destruction or Recklessness
The task of preserving electronic information is fraught with
228
pitfalls, even for the wary.
As noted previously, electronic
information by its very nature is ephemeral, and it is routinely altered
and deleted in the normal course of a company’s operations. The ease
with which it is created, transmitted, and stored also makes it difficult
for companies to locate all electronic data that may require
preservation. Indeed, given the large volumes of computer records
that now exist in some companies, it may be virtually impossible to
229
preserve all potentially relevant electronic data. For these reasons,
sanctions for spoliation should be imposed only when a party has
intentionally destroyed evidence or has been demonstrably reckless in
failing to preserve it.
The 2006 Amendments attempted to address this problem by
creating a safe harbor for electronic-document preservation. Under
new Rule 37(e), “absent exceptional circumstances,” courts may not
impose sanctions “on a party” if electronic documents are lost “as a
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
230
information system.” Although well-intentioned, this rule fails to
228. As the Managing Director of the Sedona Conference noted in a recent article,
[E]lectronically stored information can easily be rendered inaccessible though
negligence, unfamiliarity of custodians with computer technology, or routine
operations of computers and networks. The simple act of opening a file on a
computer changes the information in the “date last accessed” field of that file’s
metadata, creates or overwrites various system files, and may change substantive
information in the file itself. Computers are configured to run routine maintenance
and “clean up” functions that will change or overwrite electronically stored
information. Networks are configured to eliminate files that have not been accessed
for a reasonable period of time, or automatically delete the oldest emails in a user’s
email box. Disaster recovery backup tapes regularly create electronically stored
information by copying it from the computer hard drives, and regularly are recycled,
thus destroying that information. Halting these routine operations in response to a
“legal hold” may be difficult, impossible, unduly costly or unduly burdensome.
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 189 (2006).
229. For example, in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), an
unfair trade practices case, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s
Lanham Act claims based on the plaintiff’s failure to produce a database maintained by a
nonparty contractor. Id. at 736–37. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court’s order compelling
production would have resulted in substantial difficulties, such as purchasing a mainframe
computer or paying the contractor close to $30 million for an archive of the database. Id. at 739.
The circuit court held that given these circumstances, the plaintiff’s duties were unclear
regarding the preservation and production of the nonparty’s database, and the violation of the
order was not willful. Id. at 739–40.
230. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
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provide adequate protection for a variety of reasons. First, it does not
account for the possibility that even the most careful attempts to
locate and preserve electronic data may not succeed in preserving all
potentially relevant information. For example, if a party deletes
electronic data in good faith but not as part of routine operations,
Rule 37(e) would not protect it. Second, the phrase “routine, goodfaith operation of an electronic information system” is too vague to
provide clear guidance as to a party’s preservation obligations. It is
unclear whether sanctions would be available against a party that fails
to suspend a deleting or overwriting program that routinely rids the
company’s information system of data that are not reasonably
accessible. Third, the rule fails to explain what exceptional
circumstances might warrant the imposition of sanctions even when
data are lost through the routine, good-faith operation of a computer
system. Finally, the rule applies only to parties, and thus provides no
protection to nonparties, who play an increasingly important role in
litigation. Federal and state rules should adopt the approach recently
implemented by California, in which a safe harbor is provided not
only for destroyed evidence but also for evidence that has been “lost,
231
damaged, altered or overwritten” in good faith. Although there is a
dearth of commentary concerning California’s safe harbor provision,
which was signed into law in June 2009, the new rule reflects a fair
balance between the need for information and the costs of civil
discovery.
Finally, the rules should require courts to consider the degree of
prejudice resulting from a party’s failure to preserve the electronic
data in determining whether sanctions are warranted. This factor
should also inform a court’s decisionmaking when it determines the
232
severity of a sanction. Requiring a showing of prejudice will limit
the parties’ ability to exploit spoliation traps, such as discovery
requests crafted simply to expose perceived imperfections in
preservation efforts as a basis for sanctions or other forms of

231. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1985.8(l)(1) (West 2009). Unlike the federal rule, the
California safe harbor provision is not limited to parties. See id. (“Absent exceptional
circumstances, the court shall not impose sanctions on a subpoenaed person or any attorney of a
subpoenaed person for failure to provide electronically stored information that has been lost,
damaged, altered, or overwritten as the result of the routine, good faith operation of an
electronic information system.”).
232. See Withers, supra note 228, at 207–08 (noting that historically “the degree of prejudice
to the requesting party’s case due to the non-producing party’s loss of the data” was “an
important element in the judge’s analysis”).
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litigation leverage that have no legitimate connection to the merits of
a case. If a party cannot articulate any plausible prejudice, sanctions
have no real compensatory or deterrent purpose, particularly in the
case of inadvertent preservation failures.
E. Suspend Discovery During the Pendency of a Motion to Dismiss
Another critical reform is to stay all fact discovery during the
pendency of any motions to dismiss. Such a rule already applies to
securities class actions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
233
Act (PSLRA),
which codified a number of substantive and
procedural provisions “designed to prevent abuses of federal
234
securities class action lawsuits.” In passing the PSLRA, Congress
sought to curtail the extensive discovery requests that plaintiffs’
attorneys used to secure quick settlements and to launch fishing
expeditions before a court had even determined that the plaintiff’s
235
legal claims were viable. Recognizing that “[t]he cost of discovery
often forces innocent parties to settle frivolous securities class
236
actions,” Congress imposed an automatic stay on discovery during
237
the pendency of a motion to dismiss in private securities cases.
This small but significant change has proven extremely effective
in reining in vexatious lawsuits. “[D]efendants [in securities fraud
class actions] are now extremely reluctant to settle before a motion to

233. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
234. Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1023
(1998).
235. At congressional hearings debating the PSLRA,
reform proponents alleged that nearly every stock price decline greater than 10%
resulted in a strike suit. . . . [Public accounting firms] contended that “entrepreneurial
lawyers” would find a publicly traded company with a red flag financial issue, such as
a 10% drop in stock value, and name the auditing firm to the lawsuit for their ‘deep
pockets,’ rather than blameworthiness. Lead plaintiff’s counsel would then make
voluminous discovery requests that were so expensive to comply with that it made
sense economically to settle the lawsuit rather than protract litigation.
Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private
Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 421–23
(2005) (footnotes omitted).
236. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
237. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (automatically staying discovery except when the
judge finds it necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to a party); see also
Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 635 (2006) (noting that the purpose of the
mandatory stay provision is “to reduce the costs of meritless actions”).
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238

dismiss has been decided.” Because judges must now evaluate the
merits of a securities class-action suit before subjecting a defendant to
expensive civil discovery, there is little incentive for plaintiffs to file
239
“frivolous claims.”
In light of this success, Congress and state legislatures should
establish a similar requirement in all civil cases. Under the current
system, even an entirely frivolous lawsuit can compel a defendant to
expend millions of dollars collecting, reviewing, producing, and
preserving records. Given the exponential rise in electronic discovery
costs, this possibility exerts enormous pressure on defendants to settle
cases quickly. An automatic stay would greatly reduce the in terrorem
value of lawsuits and would ensure that lawsuits “stand or fall based
on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information
240
produced by the defendants after the action has been filed.” Such a
stay would also be consonant with the Supreme Court’s recent
241
observations in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly about the important
role of motions to dismiss in limiting the potentially enormous costs
242
of discovery.
A number of federal courts have already adopted this approach,
recognizing that because the very purpose of a motion to dismiss is to
decide whether a complaint has enough merit to open discovery, it
makes no sense to launch discovery before that threshold decision has
243
been made. As one court put it: if the parties begin discovery and a
238. Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The New Securities Class
Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 665 (1997).
239. See Dae Hwan Chung, Introduction to South Korea’s New Securities-Related Class
Action, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 165, 177 (2004) (noting that the PSLRA “stay provision has had a
great effect on curbing frivolous claims”); see also Walter C. Somol, Dredging the Safe Harbor
for Forward-Looking Statements—An Analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s
Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 265, 297–98 (1998)
(explaining that one of the “positive effects” of the PSLRA is that “companies . . . resist filing
meritless claims”).
240. S.G. Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 189 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996)).
241. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
242. Id. at 558–59 (noting that the defendants faced the prospect of having to produce
“reams and gigabytes of business records” in the event that the motion to dismiss was denied).
243. See Tostado v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., No. SA-09-CV-549-XR, 2009 WL 4774771, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2009) (granting the defendant’s motion to stay discovery pending
adjudication of a motion to dismiss); West v. Johnson, No. C08-5741RJB, 2009 WL 2163565, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2009) (“A short stay of discovery is appropriate until a decision can be
made on the various Defendants’ motions to dismiss . . . .”); Allmond v. City of Jacksonville,
No. 3:07-cv-1139-J-33TEM, 2008 WL 2704426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2008) (granting a motion
to stay discovery pending a ruling on a motion to dismiss because “upon cursory glance of
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court ultimately grants a defendant’s motion to dismiss, then the
initial discovery “would constitute needless expense and a waste
244
of . . . time and energy.”
CONCLUSION
Discovery abuse continues to be a serious problem in the
American civil justice system and is rapidly growing more pernicious.
Plaintiffs’ counsel continue to rely on the same calculus: in other
words, the time and expense defendants must devote to responding to
voluminous discovery requests will make settlement more attractive.
Burdensome discovery requests force defendants to devote
considerable resources to identifying, collecting, and copying
documents. Such requests also impose hefty legal fees because all
documents must be reviewed by counsel prior to production to ensure
that they do not contain privileged material. Plaintiffs can also impose
substantial costs by seeking to depose the defendant’s key employees.
The time needed to prepare for, travel to, and participate in such
depositions can distract these employees from their normal duties for
245
extended periods. Broadly worded interrogatories also sidetrack the
defendant’s employees, forcing them to spend considerable time
gathering information and conveying it to their attorneys.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys also continue to engage in unwarranted and
ultimately useless fishing expeditions. Broad document requests and
numerous depositions seeking mostly irrelevant information impose
significant costs on defendants because employees must spend time
searching for responsive documents and responding to interrogatories
Defendants’ motions to dismiss the resolution of the motions could dispose of the entire case”);
Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., No. 05-4294 DRH ETB, 2006 WL 897996, at
*1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (granting the defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending
resolution of a motion to dismiss when defendants “raise[d] substantial issues with regard to the
viability of plaintiffs’ complaint”); Howse v. Atkinson, No. 04-2341 GTV DJW, 2005 WL
994572, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2005) (granting a motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on
a motion to dismiss raising issues related to immunity defenses); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
563 n.8 (recognizing that courts must carefully scrutinize motions to dismiss because “before
proceeding to discovery, a complaint must allege facts suggestive of illegal conduct”).
244. Thompson v. Ret. Plan for Emps. of S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., No. 07-CV-1047, 2008
WL 4964714, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 14, 2008).
245. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 268 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting the high costs of discovery and discovery-related abuse); see also TASK
FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS
AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 6–7 (1989) (estimating that 60 percent of litigation costs in
federal cases can be attributed to discovery and abuse of the discovery process); Willging et al.,
supra note 5, at 530–31, 540, 547–50 tbls.3, 4 & 5 (detailing the costs of discovery).
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246

seeking information of little, if any, relevance. Even the Supreme
Court has recognized the deleterious effects of fishing expeditions,
247
denouncing them as “a social cost, rather than a benefit.” And the
noxious effects of fishing expeditions are not limited to needless and
excessive costs. Plaintiffs’ attorneys also use fishing expeditions to
uncover embarrassing information about the defendant or its
employees, or to force a competitor to divulge trade secrets or other
248
proprietary information.
The tactical jockeying that is now commonplace during discovery
has also given rise to more subtle forms of harassment. As one
plaintiffs’ attorney boasted, “‘a nice way to tie up the other side’ is to
secure a protective order which limits the number of [the defendant’s
employees] with whom opposing counsel can share information and
discuss the case.” The attorney went on to explain that these
protective orders “can impair an attorney’s capacity to prepare for
trial and can force him to spend time and money trying to justify a
249
modification” to the order. Such efforts to game the system serve no
legitimate purpose.
Discovery abuses have profoundly negative consequences for
American courts and, ultimately, the American economy. Justice is
denied as defendants deem litigation too expensive to pursue. Cases
languish as parties work to collect and review previously
unimaginable volumes of documents. Judges are distracted from
substantive matters to referee increasingly acrimonious discovery
disputes. Consumers are harmed as the costs of companies’ increased
litigation exposure are passed on to them in the form of higher prices.
The uncertainty and cost associated with frivolous lawsuits dissuade
foreign companies from doing business in America, depriving the
U.S. economy of a much-needed source of jobs and investment.

246. See Janet Novack, Control/Alt/Discover, FORBES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 60, 60 (“[T]he more
common problem is that companies are having to spend long hours and big dollars culling and
retrieving data . . . .”).
247. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
248. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 73, at 236 (“[Attorneys would] demand[]
that an opponent produce his income tax returns to capitalize on fears that disclosure of income
could lead to difficulties with the government or a spouse, explor[e] politically sensitive subjects
in suits against public agencies or officials to capitalize on fears of political repercussions,
inquir[e] into the dating habits of a separated spouse or threaten[] to depose the third member
of a relationship whose triangularity would best be kept secret, and focus[] discovery probes on
arguably illegal and clearly embarrassing corporate ‘contributions’ to foreign governments or
officials.”).
249. Id. at 232 n.27.
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Because the situation is deteriorating rapidly, an immediate and
comprehensive response is necessary. Ultimately, our courts need to
adopt new procedural rules that will allow parties to litigate matters
in a timely and cost-efficient manner. In the meantime, however, even
modest measures—such as more standardized case-management
orders and increased, early attention to discovery issues by judges and
magistrates—could significantly alleviate discovery abuse. In
addition, courts must be given additional resources to manage cases,
particularly the larger, more complex cases that are most susceptible
to abuse. Although those changes would not completely resolve the
issues present in the civil discovery process, they would provide a
substantial improvement and a foundation for further reforms.

